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1. Introduction 
 
Exactly one year ago, during a conversation about African politics with a close friend, the 
topic of Somalia came up. After spending some time criticizing Western governments and the 
African Union for not doing much to help Somalia, and spending even more time discussing 
Somalia’s lack of order and political unity, I told my friend that it was rather paradoxical that 
Somaliland, the only part of what used to be Somalia that actually works as a state, is not 
extended international recognition. For a few moments we laughed somewhat sombrely, but 
then started questioning why Somaliland was not recognised. We concluded that it must have 
something to do with power-politics and the general lack of international interest in getting 
involved in the region, but the explanations we came up with did not sit well with me. Back 
then I was not acquainted with any literature on Somaliland, and was almost certain that no 
one had bothered to find out exactly why Somaliland’s international recognition was still 
lacking. At the time, it seemed a good idea to research the topic further, and the more I 
researched, the more I realised how little scholarly attention Somaliland’s lack of international 
recognition has been awarded. This thesis, then, should be seen as an attempt to fill some 
scholarly gaps in the study of Somaliland and Horn of Africa politics, as well as an attempt to 
illuminate on the fuzzy and complex topic of state secession and international recognition in 
the African context. 
 
1.1 Field of study 
 
On the morning of 23rd February 2012 dozens of diplomats, heads of states, and high-level 
government officials poured into London for a one-day UK sponsored Conference on 
Somalia. The event attracted high-ranking officials from a number of countries, but its 
importance was highlighted by the attendance of US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, UK Prime Minister David Cameron, and important African 
heads of states such as Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan, Kenya’s 
Mwai Kibaki and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.1 While the conference resulted in 
little tangible results vis-à-vis a new strategy of dealing with Somalia’s security, political, and 
piracy problems, it does serve as a good starting point for a thesis on Somalia’s northern 
breakaway state of Somaliland. For, what the recent London Conference on Somalia reflects 
is a long standing practice of “facilitating” opportunities for Somalis to develop some form of 
political solution to the country’s seemingly anarchic political and security landscape. This 
“facilitation” practice, however, has over the past twenty years, and over a dozen international 
                                                 
1 The full list of attendees is available on the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office website, 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/london-conference-somalia/attendees. All additional information 
regarding the London Conference on Somalia referenced in this thesis can be found on this website. 
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peace and reconciliation conferences, resulted in very little substantial political change in 
Somalia. 
 
According to the Foreign Policy magazine’s Failed States Index 2011, Somalia is ranked top 
of the most failed of all states currently existing on our planet.2 In fact, one can only 
understand how low this designation is when observing that warring hot-spots such as the 
Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq are actually 
considered less “failed” than Somalia.3 Since the fall of Siyad Barre (Somalia’s long serving 
dictator president) in 1991, and to a large extent several years before that, Somalia ceased to 
function as a unified state with centralised political and security authority. It has recently 
observed the “20th anniversary of civil conflicts” (Warsameh 2011), and has over the past 
twenty years moved or “slid” as journalists are fond of saying, in and out of anarchy endless 
times (Tomlinson 2003; The Irish Times 2007). 
 
Yet not all parts of what used to constitute the Republic of Somalia have developed in the 
same fashion. Briefly after the fall of Siyad Barre in 1991 the north of Somalia declared 
independence as the Republic of Somaliland. In fact, the Republic of Somaliland had 
previously existed as an independent, sovereign, and internationally recognised state in 1960 
before its unification with Somalia. Since 1991, the breakaway state has managed to establish 
a high degree of security and control over its territory, provide for economic reconstruction of 
the war-torn country, and hold several democratic elections. Its success in state-building has 
been recognised even at the recent London Conference on Somalia where Somaliland officials 
were invited to attend, and the organisers welcomed “the experience that Somaliland can 
provide of peace building in the region” (London Conference Website).  
 
However, not withstanding such congratulatory statements, the international community has 
been highly reluctant and very slow to recognize Somaliland’s claims to independence and 
stabilizing role in the troubled Somali region.  As one scholar noted “the international 
response to the (re)birth of Somaliland has been marked by an overwhelming lack of interest” 
(Geldenhuys 2009, 139). To put it another way, the inability or lack of interest of the 
international community in dealing with the complex political situation in Somalia is very 
clearly reflected in the status of Somaliland. While African governments and the AU, coupled 
with the UK, UN, and other Western donors still fund and provide international recognition to 
                                                 
2 The Index is available at the Foreign Policy Magazine website, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings. 
3 While the importance or usefulness and methodological strength of this ranking can be questioned, and it can 
be argued that this ranking is fairly alarmist and somewhat biased against African states (fourteen of the top 
twenty failed states are from the continent) these issues will not be discussed here. Questioning such issues is 
important, but they are mentioned here merely to raise awareness that such rankings and designations do not 
necessarily aid in understanding why failed states exist is the first place.   
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the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, not withstanding its abysmal record of 
inaptitude, corruption, and lack of popular legitimacy in the country, the same countries and 
international organisations still do not recognise the only largely peaceful part of Somalia that 
actually boasts a legitimate and democratically elected government. That such a situation 
persists, although troubling, is quite interesting and in itself justifies a thesis seeking to 
understand and explain Somaliland’s lacking international recognition. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyze the complexities of Somaliland’s 
secession and international recognition as a sovereign state. Its central focus is on 
international relations and foreign policies of Somaliland and a host of other countries, all of 
which are, for various reasons, important for Somaliland’s international recognition. 
Therefore, the central research question of this thesis is  
 
“What are the complexities surrounding Somaliland’s international recognition and how is 
its lacking recognition influenced by the foreign policies of neighbourly states, and the wider 
relevant international community?” 
 
Because state recognition is a complex issue and most state secession cases are rather unique 
sharing only limited commonalities, to understand and try and answer this research question, 
the thesis will be guided by several working questions. These working questions will provide 
context and discuss issues which are central to understanding the complexities of 
Somaliland’s international recognition: 
 
• What is a state, how are states recognised, and what is the international legal 
framework for recognising statehood? 
• Why did Somaliland secede from Somalia, and how valid is its case for secession?4 
• What are the possible repercussions of Somaliland’s recognition for the country, 
region, and wider African community; and how do they affect Somaliland’s 
international recognition? 
• How do regional geo-strategic politics influence Somaliland’s lacking international 
recognition? 
• Why are Somaliland’s neighbours reluctant to recognize Somaliland?  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 There may be academic or philosophical dissent on using the term “valid”; I use the term only do denote 
whether a country’s case for independence is in agreement with available internationally accepted state secession 
criteria. 
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1.3 Delimitations 
 
The first and most important delimitation of this thesis is that it is primarily and almost 
exclusively concerned with Somaliland’s international relations. As such, the thesis does not 
examine in depth domestic issues of local state-building and governance. While the thesis 
does examine and discuss certain internal dynamics of state formation which are important in 
order to provide context and highlight Somaliland’s achievements in state-building and 
governance in the region, especially when contrasted with Somalia, it does not discuss the 
history and dynamics of these issues in extreme detail.  Somaliland’s internal state-building 
dynamics constitute one of the more important reasons for the country’s international 
recognition aspirations and are accorded due recognition in the discussion about the theory of 
statehood outlined in chapter three. 
 
Secondly, the thesis does not offer and is not concerned with an exhaustive review or 
discussion of state secession theory or international law on state secession. Why and how 
states secede are very broad and still debated legal and theoretical questions, and do not 
constitute the primary focus of this thesis.  This thesis is primarily concerned with the 
political aspects of Somaliland’s international recognition and why it is still lacking, and in 
terms of state secession it focuses only on this one case (while discussing where necessary 
other examples of state secession in order to highlight arguments and  provide context). This 
thesis utilises important aspects of statehood and state recognition theory in order to provide a 
background and theoretical framework against which the analysis of the complexities of 
Somaliland’s recognition should be understood. As such the thesis does not require an 
exhaustive discussion of state secession theory and the whole corpus of international law 
documents and rulings which deal with state sovereignty and secession, and Somaliland’s 
secession will be dealt with thoroughly in chapter four. 
 
Thirdly, this thesis does not utilise any international relations theory to explain why 
Somaliland’s international recognition is lacking. While such theoretical exposés could 
possibly involve examining theories of Realism, Neo-Realism, Institutionalism, or 
Constructivism, they would not necessarily aid the reader in understanding why Somaliland’s 
secession and recognition is a complex issue, and would certainly require a thesis of 
considerably greater length. Since this thesis is concerned with a particular case study and 
examines contemporary and current political issues which do not necessarily fit into any one 
international relations theory, it would therefore be rather irresponsible to try and mould 
certain events into theoretical frameworks simply for the sake of utilising a theory. While this 
is a thesis about international politics it does not pretend to offer a grand explanation of state 
secession and recognition issues, but merely attempts to understand and analyze one particular 
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case. As such, what is more important here than a theoretical exposition on why states do, or 
do not recognise new states in general, is the analysis of current political developments and 
attitudes towards Somaliland’s recognition in particular. 
 
1.4 Methodology and sources 
 
1.4.1 Methodology 
 
This thesis is largely concerned with relatively current literature sourced from a host of 
websites, newspapers and magazines, non-governmental organizations, governmental 
websites, and international organizations. In the realm of primary sources, this thesis utilizes 
a number of empirical studies conducted by non-governmental organizations, classified US 
diplomatic cables, and newspaper articles and magazine analyses which offer current 
information on Somaliland developments. The great value of the primary sources used in this 
thesis is that they constitute key sources on Somaliland, its history, political and economic 
developments, and international relations. As I have not been able to undertake empirical 
research by conducting interviews with relevant stakeholders from the African Union, 
Somaliland, and other African states, the primary sources consulted have proved immensely 
significant for the writing of the thesis. 
 
The lack of interviews or direct contact with government officials of the AU and Horn of 
Africa states presents the greatest limitation of this thesis. When studying the field of 
contemporary Somali political developments it would have been very significant to conduct 
interviews with relevant stakeholders and find out first hand some unofficial views on 
Somaliland’s recognition. While my initial idea was to conduct interviews with Somaliland, 
African Union, Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Djibouti officials, I have been unable to secure any 
such opportunities and this has limited my options for original empirical research. However, 
this limitation is offset as much as possible by utilizing primary and secondary sources which 
include significant interview components; by making extensive use of newspaper articles 
citing interviews and statements by relevant officials; and by using classified diplomatic 
cables which offer unique, behind-the-scenes first-hand information about Somaliland which 
have not yet been analyzed in scholarly discussions of Somaliland’s recognition. 
 
In many ways, writing about Somaliland is difficult, but in a way it is also very easy. 
Somaliland’s international recognition is not a popular topic and there exist only a small 
number of studies and analyses that contribute knowledge to the topic of Somaliland’s 
international recognition. While there are many works our there on Somalia in general, only a 
handful of them deal with Somaliland. A significant proportion of books on Somalia are 
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concerned mostly with explaining how the country fell apart politically, how it currently is, 
and why piracy exists in the country. On the other hand, the published works on Somaliland 
are generally interested in Somaliland’s exceptional case of state-building and reconciliation, 
and only devote small fragments of their contents to its international recognition.  
 
Most of the literature consulted in the process of writing this thesis is concerned with case 
studies. This has important repercussions for the current study of Somaliland as it presents a 
singular case study, which is compared to other cases only when the discussion and analysis 
require so. Although the primary concern of this thesis is Somaliland, it draws on other case 
studies and examples of state secession which help illuminate Somaliland’s situation as well 
as the complex and often “murky” world of international state recognition. Hence, this case 
study when necessary refers to other historical or current examples of contested territories 
seeking international recognition. This methodology does not make the thesis a comparative 
study, as it only focuses on one main case, but rather allows for a greater flexibility in 
comparing and highlighting other cases and examples which allow a better understanding of 
the arguments presented regarding Somaliland. 
 
1.4.2 Sources 
 
It is very important to outline what constitutes the main source material for this thesis. With 
regards to primary sources some literature requires specific mention as it is of central 
importance for the thesis. In illuminating on the murky and complex state of Somaliland’s 
international recognition, and trying to find “insider” information about the behind-the-
scenes diplomatic developments, a number of classified US diplomatic cables were of great 
help. These cables were only recently published by the website WikiLeaks and shed 
important light on the diplomatic efforts of Somaliland government officials in lobbying for 
international recognition, but also on the attitudes of the US, and Horn of Africa states 
towards Somaliland’s recognition. The diplomatic cables were written by US embassy staff 
in the form of minutes or meeting notes and mainly report what was said during a meeting 
between US officials and others.  
 
Of the few reports written by non-governmental organizations about Somaliland and its 
international status in the past two decades, two were central for the writing of this thesis. In 
2006 the International Crisis Group published Somaliland: Time for African Union 
Leadership which covers a number of issues and was particularly helpful in illuminating the 
strength of Somaliland’s statehood claims and its troubled relationship with the AU. The 
second highly important work was published in mid 2011 by the Brenthurst Foundation  
titled African Game Changer? The Consequences of Somaliland’s International (Non) 
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Recognition. This report is one of the latest studies currently available and offers an 
insightful overview of Somaliland’s independence claims and international recognition 
problems, while discussing at the same time in detail the AU’s position on Somaliland, and 
options for Somaliland in breaking the deadlock of international recognition. It is particularly 
useful and illuminating as it was written by eminent experts of African politics from the UK, 
Denmark, and US, but also because it is co-authored by the former deputy chair of the AU 
Commission, Mr. Patrick Mazimhaka. While both of these reports are generally supportive of 
recognition for Somaliland their significance is not so much in the presentation of 
Somaliland’s case for independence (although this is important), but in the detailed accounts 
of international attitudes towards Somaliland’s recognition.  
 
Another relevant and important primary source is the Republic of Somaliland’s 2001 policy 
document Somaliland: Demand for International Recognition, which offers Somaliland’s 
official reasons for seeking independence and its arguments on why it should be 
internationally recognized. This document is crucial in explaining Somaliland’s motives for 
seeking an end to its union with Somalia. However, it is important to keep in mind that this 
document is also a propaganda tool justifying Somaliland’s secession, and is biased in that its 
main purpose is to promote Somaliland’s recognition. Since this document was written a 
decade after Somaliland declared independence it is very possible that its authors interpret 
certain events or the significance of some actions with the benefit of hindsight; i.e. justifying 
Somaliland’s choice to secede by stressing the poor relationship between Somaliland and 
Somalia. While this does not mean we should discard everything that is written in the 
document, it does mean that we should exercise a particularly critical approach to reading it, 
and accepting some of its arguments. 
 
Finally, perhaps the most important AU document regarding Somaliland, the 2005 African 
Union Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland Resume, is used in this thesis because it discloses 
the Union’s recommended position on Somaliland, and remains to date the only official AU 
document assessing Somaliland’s independence claims.5 This unpublished four page 
document is carefully worded (not to give away support for a secessionist movement) but 
displays sympathy for Somaliland’s case, and in very unambiguous terms recommends that 
Somaliland’s case should be dealt with by the AU on its own terms, acknowledging the 
territory’s unique political history.  
 
As far as other primary sources are concerned the thesis consults a host of websites and news 
outlets, the most important or helpful of which are the Somaliland Government, 
                                                 
5 I would like to thank Mr. Mark Bradbury for kindly providing me with this unpublished report. 
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SomalilandLaw and the Somaliland Times websites.6 All three of these websites are 
indispensible for anyone researching and writing about Somaliland. In general, one always 
needs to be cautious when consulting media outlets and I have mainly used these websites for 
gathering information on interviews, and current and past events rather than interpretations 
and analyses of Somaliland’s situation and the strength of its case for independence. Other 
useful media outlets include the British Broadcasting Service, Al-Jazeera, Afrol News, and 
the East African magazine.  
 
In the realm of secondary sources general literature on Somaliland is rather scant. 
Monographs on Somaliland are few, and this thesis has attempted to utilize as many of them 
as possible. These include Mark Bradbury’s 2008 seminal Becoming Somaliland in which the 
author traces Somaliland’s development as a sovereign state from 1991 onwards, and briefly 
discusses its lack of formal recognition. While this book does not delve into the issue of 
Somaliland’s international recognition, its key importance is in the discussion and outline of 
how Somalilanders constituted their state, and how state-building had proceeded from 1991 
onwards. As much of the case in favor of Somaliland’s international recognition (especially 
vis-à-vis Somalia) is based on Somaliland’s ability to rebuild itself in terms of governance, 
statehood, and infrastructure (in stark contrast to Somalia), this book is central for 
understanding the bases of Somaliland’s statehood aspirations. 
 
Another useful work on Somaliland is Ioan Lewis’ 2008 Understanding Somalia and 
Somaliland which appears to be a sort of re-print of Lewis’ previous work on Somalia with a 
brief addition of the discussion on Somaliland. The third monograph on Somaliland utilized 
in this thesis is Iqbal Jhazbhay 2007 PhD thesis, which was published in 2009 as Somaliland: 
an African struggle for nationhood and international recognition.7 This work is central to 
any discussion of Somaliland’s international recognition as it benefits from the author’s 
interviews with high ranking officials (Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, 
Somaliland’s ex-president Kahin, and numerous AU officials), and from the author’s 
personal involvement in several high-level meetings discussing Somalia with South African 
and US officials.8 
 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately the government website was shut down and under construction for the past 6 months, and was of 
little assistance in the writing stages of this thesis. However, I did benefit from information sourced from the 
website during preliminary research before it was taken down for maintenance. On legal issues regarding 
Somaliland, its constitution, and its recognition the SomalilandLaw website was of primary importance. 
7 Unfortunately, I was unable to secure a copy of this book but have in stead made use of Professor Jhazbhay’s 
PhD thesis. 
8 There is also a very recent book by Marlene Renders Consider Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional 
Leaders and Institutions, which focuses (much like Mark Bradbury’s Becoming Somaliland) on the internal and 
domestic dynamics of state-building in Somaliland. 
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With regards to international law governing statehood and secession, and the legal aspects of 
Somaliland’s independence and recognition several works are of significance: Malcolm N. 
Shaw’s International Law, Deon Geldenhuys’ 2009 Contested States in World Politics, 
Carroll and Rajagopal’s 1993 The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland, Alison 
K. Eggers’ 2007 When is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland, and Peter 
Roethke’s 2011 The Right to Secede Under International Law: The Case of Somaliland. 
While this is not an exhaustive list of the literature available on Somaliland’s independence, 
these are, to the author’s knowledge, some of the main discussions of Somaliland’s legal 
rights to independence and recognition, and many reports and articles dealing with 
Somaliland often refer to these studies in providing evidence for Somaliland’s 
independence.9 
 
The secondary sources noted above, in addition to other relevant literature used in this thesis, 
provide highly critical and important analyses which aid our understanding of the 
complexities of Somaliland’s international recognition. As such, secondary sources are of 
key importance in placing Somaliland’s international recognition in the wider context of state 
secession movements in Africa, but also in understanding why international recognition is 
still lacking and how this is influenced by neighbourly, regional, and trans-continental 
politics. 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
 
The thesis is structured in six chapters. Following this introductory chapter the second 
chapter briefly outlines Somalia and Somaliland’s history, making due references to its 
colonial period, but concentrating mostly on post-independence developments. Providing 
historical background is necessary in order to allow the reader to understand the historical 
and political context of Somaliland’s past and the events that brought on its secession, and 
continue to influence its international status. 
 
Chapter three sets out a legal and theoretical framework for understanding statehood and 
state recognition and identifies the main theoretical positions the thesis will engage with. It 
outlines the theoretical perspectives contained in the working questions and explains how 
these perspectives are applicable in understanding Somaliland’s complex situation. 
 
                                                 
9 Another monograph which could be included in this list is Michael Schoiswohl’s 2004 Status and (Human 
Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’. The 
Resurrection of Somaliland Against All International ‘Odds’: State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition and 
Human Rights. Unfortunately this work was unavailable to me as the Roskilde Library does not have a copy. 
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Chapter four analyzes the legal case for Somaliland’s independence. While legalities may not 
play a decisive role in state recognition, their importance in justifying state recognition is still 
high. The central role of this chapter is to discuss Somaliland’s secession in the context of 
generally accepted criteria for statehood, and outline why Somaliland’s secession is unique 
and specific when compared to other relevant secession examples.  
 
The fifth chapter analyzes some of the most important aspects influencing state recognition; 
the legal, political, security, and economic repercussions of extending formal recognition. 
This chapter discusses important arguments in favour of and against Somaliland’s 
international recognition, which serve as a basis for understanding how complex the issue of 
international recognition is. 
 
The sixth, and final analytical chapter represents in a way the pinnacle of the discussion of the 
complexities of Somaliland’s international recognition, and focuses on analyzing the key 
players in Somaliland’s recognition game. This chapter is central in understanding why 
Somaliland’s international recognition is still lacking, as it discusses the positions of key 
states towards Somaliland’s recognition (which are in turn influenced by the legal issues and 
political, economic, and security concerns already discussed in the previous two chapters). 
 
The sixth chapter is followed by a concluding section which brings together the story of the 
complexities of Somaliland’s international recognition. 
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2. Understanding how the present came about:  
Placing Somalia and Somaliland in historical context 
 
Unlike many other African countries, Somalia upon independence actually enjoyed a 
significant sense of national identity.  As one observer put it, the Somalis constituted a nation, 
but not a state, although they did possess the cultural prerequisites for statehood (Lewis 2008, 
27).  The reasons why Somalis are considered to have a strong national identity is because 
they share a common culture based on folk traditions, a pastoralist way of life, common 
language, and common religion-Sunni Islam (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 132; Lewis 2004, 
492). Furthermore, most of the Somali population recognises and draws ancestry from one of 
the five main Somali clans: Hawiye, Darod, Issaq, Dir, and Digil-Mirifle. These clans are 
further subdivided into sub-clan groups and extended families. The importance such clan and 
sub-clan structures have for the Somali population and political circumstances in the country 
is significant: these clan structures predate the Somali state and in current times of political 
insecurity and physical hardship often constitute the main socio-political units around which 
allegiances are formed. As Ioan Lewis has argued “the genealogies embodying the invisible 
force of clanship are, therefore, in effect genetic guidelines for the social and political 
interactions of those whose descent they record” (2004, 491). Although this description may 
display a rigid emphasis on the importance of clan genealogies for Somalis, especially since 
such views have been challenged, we should not deny, as Besteman argues “ the existence of 
lineages in Somali society, nor their importance to personal identity” (1999, 19).10 
 
During the period of colonialism from roughly the 1880s to World War Two, the Somali 
people were administered by several European colonial powers: the French (in what is now 
Djibouti), the British (in what is now the self-proclaimed state of Somaliland, and Northern 
Kenya), and the Italians (in Somalia proper). As a result of these different colonial 
administrations and their administrative and governance traditions, the inhabitants of these 
regions experienced very different colonial legacies. 
 
The British, for example, favored a limited or “thin” involvement in Somaliland and invested 
meagerly in the local infrastructure with minimal numbers of British settlements, whereas the 
Italians invested more in Somalia and encouraged Italian settlement and the development of 
local agriculture (Lewis 2008, 30-31). This is not the place to offer an exhaustive account of 
different colonial policies in Somalia; suffice it to say that different administrative languages 
                                                 
10 Catherine Besteman has challenged the prevailing view found in media reporting and many scholarly analyses 
of the centrality of the clans and clan based hatreds in explaining Somalia’s societal breakdown. She has argued 
that in addition to clan distinctions, there are also racial cleavages in Somalia, and such cleavages have directly 
influences the very difficult position of , for example, the Gosha farmers in Somalia’s Jubba valley (1999, 228-
231). These descendants of black African slaves from lands between Kenya and Mozambique have been 
historically discriminated against because of their race and pastoralist occupation (Ibid., 21). 
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coupled with different governing traditions paved the way for severe difficulties for Somalis 
in bringing the two colonial territories together upon independence. 
 
In July 1960, after some eighty years of European domination and overlordship, the new 
Republic of Somalia was proclaimed (Meredith 2006, 465). The British protectorate of 
Somaliland gained independence on 26 June 1960, four days before it joined Italian Somalia 
on 1 July to form the new Republic (Lewis 2008, 33). This fact is highly important in regards 
to Somaliland’s current sovereignty claims and drive for international recognition as it serves 
to prove Somaliland was an internationally independent political entity even if for only four 
days. What is also important to note is that at independence ethnic Somalis inhabited 
significant areas outside of Somalia’s formal borders. Kenya’s Northern District, Djibouti, 
and the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia were then home to some 4 million Somalis 
(Meredith 2006, 465), providing a constant drive for Somali irredentism and calls for a 
Greater Somalia (unifying all those territories under Somali rule).  
 
According to some scholars, during the first 9 years of civilian rule in Somalia, the 
government “proved to be experimental, inefficient, corrupt, and incapable of creating any 
kind of national political culture” (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 133). While this may be a 
strong indictment of the first civilian administrations, they did prove to be highly corrupt and 
unable to deal with the many problems the newly independent nation faced. Some of these 
problems included the newly unified Republic’s legal system - four of which she inherited 
(Italian law, British common law, Islamic law-Sharia, and Somali customary law-Xeer) and 
needed to merge so as to create an integrated legal code. Also, within the first year the 
enthusiasm for the unification waned as northerners began to realise how marginalised they 
were becoming. In British Somaliland members of the northern Issaq clan constituted the 
majority of administrative appointments and were finding themselves in a very small minority 
in the new Mogadishu based government. About one quarter of seats in the new parliament 
were allocated to northerners, and with most if not all senior posts in the government and 
military allocated to southerners, the political marginalisation felt by northerners was 
considerable (Bradbury 2008, 33). To this, should be added the experience of economic 
marginalisation, highlighted by the distance between Hargeisa (capital of Somaliland), and the 
new Republic’s capital in Mogadishu, and lack of state administrative services in Somaliland. 
This was to a great extent influenced by the British colonial lack of investment in and 
development of Somaliland, but nevertheless served as a reason for frustration. All of this 
contributed to the troublesome referendum to approve a provisional constitution in June 1961, 
where the northerners rejected the constitution, while it was strongly supported in the south 
(Lewis 2008, 35). Worse was to follow when in December of the same year a group of British 
Seceding but not Succeeding                                                                                             MA Thesis Nikola Pijovic            
 
 20 
trained junior military officers in the north unsuccessfully attempted a coup with the aim of 
ending the union (Bradbury 2008, 33).  
 
Towards the end of the 1960s corruption was seriously disrupting the cohesion of the political 
class in the country, and competition for governmental resources was rife. In the 1969 
elections some 1002 candidates from a whopping sixty two parties competed for a hundred 
and twenty three National Assembly seats, and following the election all but one of the 
Assembly members crossed the floor to join the ruling party, thereby effectively creating a 
one-party state (Lewis 1972, 397). As Lewis concluded “the National Assembly was no 
longer the symbol of free speech and fair play for all citizens. On the contrary, it had been 
turned into a sordid market-place where deputies traded their votes for personal rewards with 
scant regard for the interests of their constituents” (Ibid. 399). In October 1969, the President 
of Somalia Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated, and a bloodless military coup led by 
General Mohamed Siyad Barre suspended the constitution leaving him and the army in 
power. 
 
2.1 Somalia under Siyad Barre 
 
When Siyad Barre came to power he projected himself as a “modernist”, banned all clan-
based organizations, undertook considerable social reforms (especially regarding female 
rights) and nourished Somalia’s dream of unifying all Somali inhabited territories (Bradbury 
2008, 36-37). Over those first few years in power Barre imposed authoritarian socialist rule 
and developed (and maintained) strong ties with the Soviet Union, which allowed Somalia in 
the span of less than a decade, to build up one of Africa’s largest standing armies. While the 
period of Barre’s first 7 years in power was relatively peaceful (his regime concentrated 
mostly on local development and consolidation of its authority), what followed would 
destabilize the country and sow the seeds of discontent amongst Somalis for years to come. 
 
Between 1977 and 1991, Somalia suffered three significant armed conflicts, all of which 
contributed to the destabilization of the regime, severe economic hardship, and ultimate 
fragmentation of the Republic. The first conflict, the Ogaden War, was fought against 
Ethiopia in 1977-1978. In an attempt to realize the dream of the unification of Greater 
Somalia, Barre’s forces intervened in support of Somali rebel fighters (Western Somali 
Liberation Front) to expel Ethiopians from ethnic Somali territory in the region of Ogaden. 
Unfortunately for Barre, his patrons in the Soviet Union decided to switch sides in the midst 
of the war, and utilizing a massive airlift transported Cuban military personnel from Angola to 
Ethiopia while supporting the Ethiopians with military aid (Lewis 2008, 43-45). Although 
Barre’s forces controlled some ninety percent of the Ogaden in September 1977, by March 
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1978 they were forced to withdraw almost completely from the region (Clarke and Gosende 
2003, 136).  
 
This loss was not only devastating militarily, but also laid the foundation for future internal 
conflict and the further strengthening of clan-based structures within Somali society. A coup 
was attempted against Barre in April 1978, after which the dictator abandoned any semblance 
of governing without considerations of clan allegiance and executed all but one of the coup 
plotters. Barre’s rule became increasingly tribalist as he strengthened his hold on power by 
progressively restricting state patronage to his immediate and extended family and the 
government became dominated by members of his Marrehan clan (Bradbury 2008, 43). 
 
After the defeat in the Ogaden War and during the 1980s Barre developed a strong anti-Soviet 
stance, which resulted in high levels of aid from the Western world. For example, in the 1980s 
Italy provided Somalia with $1 billion in aid, half of it in military supplies, while the US 
supplied some $800 million worth of aid, one-quarter in military assistance (Meredith 2006, 
468). By the end of the 1980s, the country was receiving twenty percent of total US aid to 
Africa (Besteman 1999, 15). The government also implemented various trade liberalization 
policies which unfortunately mostly favored Barre’s circle of cronies, and the economic 
situation in the country was not improved by high levels of foreign aid (much of which was 
spent on the military). Somalia’s economic situation was made worse not only by rampant 
military spending, but also by the consequences of the Ogaden War: by the end of 1980 
virtually one out of every four people in Somalia was a refugee (Lewis 2008, 65).  
 
The second significant armed conflict Somalia suffered was between the Somali National 
Movement (SNM) and Siyad Barre’s regime.11 For the better part of the 1980s this was a 
minor insurgency based mostly in the north and north-west of the country, the area roughly 
corresponding to today’s region of Somaliland. Between 1982 and May 1988 the SNM 
military campaign remained a small scale revolt, and was little more than “an irritant to the 
regime” (Bradbury 2008, 61). The SNM was dominated by members of the northern-based 
Issaq clan and found it difficult to secure greater support among other Somali clans. However, 
towards the end of the 1980s that changed as the SNM became allied with several other 
southern based insurgency and liberation movements aimed at overthrowing the Barre regime.  
 
The root causes of the SNM’s insurgency lie not only in the general oppressiveness of Barre’s 
regime, especially after the Ogaden War, but also in the increasingly harsh military 
administration and economic marginalization of the north. Barre marginalized the north by 
allocating greater funds to the development of Mogadishu and the south, and by attempting to 
                                                 
11 The SNM was founded in London in 1981 by Issaq expatriates (Bradbury 2008, 61). 
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isolate Issaq businessmen and traders with specific economic policies aimed at spreading 
patronage to those who supported his regime (Bradbury 2008, 58-60). This systematic 
underdevelopment, coupled with political and economic harassment, and severe reprisals 
meted out against anyone thought of supporting the SNM took a heavy toll on the population. 
As Lewis stated, to a foreign observer the north “began to look and feel like a downtrodden 
colony under alien military rule. Indeed, this was how it was perceived locally” (2008, 68). 
 
The main impetus for a daring military campaign against the government in which the SNM 
captured Somalia’s second largest town, the Somaliland capital of Hargeisa, came with the 
signing of a formal peace accord between Somalia and Ethiopia in April 1988 (Lewis 2008, 
71). Faced with the loss of its sanctuaries in Ethiopia and the potential death of the movement, 
SNM forces acted against the regime, but their campaign proved to be a military disaster. As a 
result of Barre’s substantial military capabilities and foreign support, the government’s war 
against the SNM was exceptionally devastating for the north of Somalia. Hargeisa was 
bombarded heavily and almost completely destroyed, and the SNM lost half of its fighting 
force trying to hold onto the city (Bradbury 2008, 62). Thousands of civilians were killed and 
a testament to the senselessness of the killing was a rebellion by Somali air force pilots who 
declined to further slaughter fellow citizens and defected with their aircrafts to neighboring 
Ethiopia (Clarke and Gosende 2003, 137). The civil war was disastrous for northern Somalia: 
more than 300 000 Issaq refugees fled into Ethiopia, while another half a million fled to other 
parts of Somalia (Ibid.).  
 
Barre’s horrendous repression of the SNM and killing of many civilians proved a turning 
point for the insurgency. The SNM struggled to secure wide-spread civilian support in the 
north, but Barre’s counter offensive and indiscriminate killing of civilians mobilized the local 
Issaq population and a major recruitment for the SNM ensued. Over the following three years 
the SNM slowly took control of the traditionally Issaq dominated rural areas of the north-
west, but scarcely ventured into non-Issaq zones (Bradbury 2008, 62-63). The government’s 
savage military campaign in the north became one of the main reasons why the Issaq 
dominated north-west of Somalia seceded from the rest of the country in 1991. 
 
The third significant armed conflict in Somalia prior to 1991 pitted Barre’s armed forces 
against a growing number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990, and took 
place concurrently with the government’s war against the SNM. This conflict marked the end 
of Barre’s hold on power, who by the end of 1990 scarcely controlled anything outside the 
capital Mogadishu and was derisively called “the Mayor of Mogadishu” (Meredith 2006, 469; 
Clapham 1998, 151). After protracted street fighting and considerable devastation of the 
capital, the militias and liberation movements managed to expel Barre from Somalia in 
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January 1991. However, Barre’s expulsion was not followed by a replacement government, 
but instead by a long period of violent warfare and looting. As Menkhaus has argued, the 
Barre regime’s “divide-and-rule tactics stoked deep interclan animosities and distrust, and are 
held partially responsible for the failure of clans to unite in a post-Barre government” (2006, 
80). With the fall of the Siyad Barre regime Somalia closed the curtain on a dark and 
catastrophic episode of its national history, the repercussions of which are still felt today. 
Unfortunately what was to follow did little to improve the livelihoods of the majority of the 
population, and most of the country descended into another stage of civil war which has 
resulted in the political fragmentation of Somalia still present twenty years later. 
 
2.2 Somalia and Somaliland after 1991 
 
Armed conflict raged across southern Somalia throughout 1991-1992 as clan-based militias 
fought each other for control of resources in various towns and ports. The post-Barre war 
which may have begun as a struggle for control of the government, quickly turned into 
predatory looting and banditry by various militias. Towards 1992 Somalia was affected by a 
massive famine, and the casualties of the fighting and famine combined are estimated at 250 
000 Somali deaths (Menkhaus 2006, 81). The international food aid sent to alleviate the 
famine quickly became part of the war economy (a commodity worth fighting over). 
 
In response to the widely media covered and significantly devastating famine of 1992, and the 
inability of the food aid to reach its intended recipients safely, the UN and US intervened in 
Somalia with a view to protecting the food aid and helping the famine ravaged south Somalia. 
There is no need here for a detailed outline of this intervention as the history of this period is 
amply documented. Suffice it to say that the UN and US were not successful in building any 
sort of consensus between the warring militias, or forming a peace deal. After the infamous 
and highly publicized 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident in which Somali militias shot down 
two US helicopters and killed 18 soldiers, the US had had enough of Somalia. US troops 
withdrew from the country in March 1994 and soon after the UN followed suit, leaving the 
country at the mercy of its own warring parties and clan supported militias (Clarke and 
Gosende 2003, 143-145).  
 
Since 1995, armed conflict has continued to plague south and central Somalia, but the nature 
of the conflict has changed. From 1995 to 2006 the majority of armed conflicts in the country 
occurred locally, pitting subclans against one another, and the duration and intensity of these 
conflicts was diverse (Menkhaus 2006, 88). In the north-east of the country, regional 
authorities formed the state of Puntland, which considers itself part of a Federal Somalia 
(Puntland State of Somalia Constutution). Puntland has developed a semi-autonomous state-
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like structure which allows it to foster a more secure and peaceful environment than that in 
central and southern Somalia (Menkhaus 2006, 83). Unfortunately, since 2008 Puntland has 
come under significant international attention due to the problems of piracy off the coast of 
Somalia, which presents a considerable nuisance and threat to international shipping 
companies, and individuals sailing in those areas. 
 
One of Barre’s longest lasting legacies has been the reduction of national politics to narrow 
tribal and clan based interests which still dominate the political landscape of south and central 
Somalia. Siyad Barre was the “master tribalist” who distributed money and arms to his friends 
and cronies and encouraged them to fight his enemies, who were in turn accused of tribalism 
and clan politics (Lewis 2008, 76). On the other hand, by “destroying his country’s economy 
through corruption and inefficiency, Siyad also promoted those conditions of scarce resources 
and insecurity on which clan loyalty thrives, since clan solidarity then offers the only hope of 
survival” (Ibid.). This legacy is one of the main reasons why south and central Somalia 
remain without any kind of trans-local political authority, and where such authority did 
emerge, international forces conspired to neutralize it out of their own interests (see section on 
Sharia Courts below). 
 
2.2.1 The Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia 
 
Although Somalia has remained without a functional central government for the past twenty 
years, there were, and still are international efforts to create one. Between 1993 and 2003, 
thirteen international conferences on Somalia were held, each with a task of somehow 
developing or forming a central government (Bradbury 2008, 49).  The Djibouti conference 
on Somalia held in 2000 in the town of Arta did manage to give birth to a Transitional 
National Government (TNG) of Somalia, but this conference was so heavily filled by ex-
members of Siyad Barre’s carefully selected parliament (about sixty percent of the 245 
members were ex-Barre parliamentarians) that when the former US ambassador to Somalia 
Robert Oakley dropped in on the conference, he jokingly asked “Where is Siyad?” (Lewis 
2008, 82). This first “national” government had difficulties gaining even basic support in 
Mogadishu where it literally controlled only a few streets, and never established any 
meaningful authority.  
 
In 2004 there was another international conference on Somalia (this time in Kenya), the 
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, and it resulted in the formation of the successor 
to the previous national government, now named the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
of Somalia. This remains the current internationally backed government of Somalia, but it too 
has been unable to establish itself as a serious political force in the country. In fact, its very 
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survival is heavily dependant on international funding and military support, a fact highly 
visible in the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia (discussed below). 
 
The TFG is currently headed by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former commander of the Union of 
Islamic Courts. It is heavily supported by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
military forces, and controls most of Mogadishu, although Al-Shabaab’s terrorist attacks in 
the city are constant (United Nations 2012, 5, par.27). The Kenyan military intervention 
against Al-Shabaab strongholds in the south of Somalia, and Ethiopia’s renewed push into the 
country have the potential to further weaken the Islamist militias and aid the TFG in 
extending its authority outside of Mogadishu. However, the TFG still lacks a credible 
following in Mogadishu and much of the country. Whether it can become popular with the 
people remains to be seen, especially if the Kenyan and Ethiopian occupations of parts of 
Somalia become protracted, and the population unites against the invading forces. 
 
2.2.2 Sharia courts and the Union of Islamic Courts 
 
From the late 1990s onwards much of south Somalia experienced slight improvements in 
local systems of governance. In certain areas local polities, generally comprised of Sharia 
courts sprung up, providing some amount of law and order to the population.12 Sharia courts 
first emerged in northern Mogadishu in August 1994 and were local, clan based initiatives 
funded by local Muslim clerics or businessmen, and aimed at providing a degree of law, order 
and security in a stateless and anarchic situation (Mwangi 2010, 89). The resources of these 
courts were usually derived from a combination of private contributions and taxation of 
various business and militia activities.  
 
The first generation of Sharia courts was widely popular. After years of protracted and bloody 
fighting in which families and clans suffered, local populations were displaced and local 
businesses were held hostage to militia tax-levies and protection money, Somali communities 
welcomed Sharia courts and supported them as a means of restoring the rule of law 
(Menkhaus 2006, 85). Since these courts were very local in jurisdiction and served specific 
sub-clans or local neighborhoods, Sharia courts offered local communities a strong and 
legitimate governance mechanism. Controlled by a coalition of clan elders, Islamic clerics, 
and local businessmen these early Islamic courts were moderate in nature and generally 
opposed to radical Islam (Ibid., 85-86).  
 
                                                 
12 Sharia courts generally administer Islamic Law (Sharia), and in some instances offer the parties a choice 
between the application of Sharia or Somali customary law, the Xeer (Menkhaus 2006, 85-86; Johnson and 
Vriens 2011).  
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By late 2005, eleven clan-based Islamic courts were established in Mogadishu alone; some 
favoring radical Islam, others embodying a more traditional character (Mwangi 2010, 90). 
These courts formed a loose coalition dubbed the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), and while 
most of these courts were primarily concerned with security in their own areas of the capital, 
they did contribute troops and equipment to a combined UIC militia force of 400 members 
(Ibid.). What is important to remember in regards to the popularity of these Islamic courts 
with local communities is that their militias were formed by very religious and highly 
disciplined young men. They were a far cry from the parasitical and ill-disciplined groups of 
youngsters first controlled in the early 1990s by Mogadishu’s warlords, and then left to 
develop their own exploitative and criminal groups. As a more disciplined and often better 
equipped force, these Islamic court militias were able to successfully deal with security issues 
in their local spheres of influence, and when united under the UIC formed an impressive 
fighting force. 
 
In June 2006, the UIC defeated the various clan based warlords who had effectively reigned 
over Mogadishu since the early 1990s and restored a high degree of peace to the capital; a feat 
neither the warlords nor the internationally backed TFG were capable of. For the first time 
since the collapse of the Somali state, an organization managed to unite Mogadishu and 
deliver peace and security to its population. However, the success of the UIC was perceived 
as a threat by the TFG and Ethiopia, both of whom claimed that the UIC’s leadership included 
Muslim terrorists implicated in bombings in Ethiopia and Kenya, a claim reiterated by the US 
(Lewis 2008, 88).  The rule of the UIC which had, for the first time since the late 1980s, 
brought relatively centralized political governance to south Somalia was brought to an end by 
the oncoming Ethiopian invasion.  
 
The Ethiopian invasion began towards the end of 2006 with thousands of troops, tanks, heavy 
artillery and air support pushing into Somalia. The US supported the Ethiopian army 
indirectly, and the invasion seemed a success when the UIC retreated from Mogadishu.13 
However, the Ethiopian army was soon embroiled in intense street-fighting, and turned their 
heavy artillery against civilian quarters in the city. What ensued were extremely high rates of 
civilian casualties and it is estimated that as many as half a million civilians fled what some 
have called the “holocaust” in Mogadishu (Lewis 2008, 89). Since the Ethiopian withdrawal 
in January 2009, the TFG has been supported by AMISOM troops, and this is still the case 
today. Once the Ethiopians withdrew the TFG quickly lost control of south Somalia. What 
sprung up from the remnants of the UIC, and is currently in control of large parts of southern 
Somalia is the loosely affiliated Al-Shabaab group. This affiliation of militias and clan-based 
groups is designated as a terrorist group by the US and other Western governments because of 
                                                 
13 In 2007, the US also supported Ethiopia directly by bombing UIC positions in Somalia (Reynolds 2007). 
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its links to Al-Qaeda (Al Jazerra 2011).14 It is only recently that Al-Shabaab has been forced 
out of Mogadishu, and the joint AU, Ethiopian, and Kenyan military offensive currently 
underway is attempting to defeat the group. 
 
2.2.3 Developments in Somaliland since 1991 
 
However, in contrast to events unfolding in the south of Somalia, the northern regions of the 
country did not suffer such large-scale warfare and devastating plunder and famine. Although 
the north of Somalia did suffer sporadic clan infighting and severe economic hardship, 
towards May 1991 a surprising degree of peace between Issaq and non-Issaq clans in the 
region was secured through the mediation of traditional clan elders. In that month the elders 
of northern clans and the leadership of the SNM held a national conference in Burco; the 
“Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples” (Bradbury 2008, 80). The Burco conference was 
convened as a forum to discuss and consolidate the cessation of hostilities and the future of 
the north (Ibid.) It appears that the SNM leadership did not have an agenda of secession for 
the conference, but the prevailing view of many delegates was that the union with the south 
should be revised. As Lewis states “there was widespread hatred and distrust of the south 
(identified with Siyad’s misrule) and a strong tide of public feeling favoring separatism” 
(2008, 75). Angry mobs of soldiers and civilians gathered around the conference venue and 
demanded independence from Mogadishu. The SNM leadership bowed to public pressure and 
on 18 May declared the region’s independence from the south proclaiming the “Republic of 
Somaliland” (ICG 2003, 9). 
 
The Republic of Somaliland, roughly the size of England and Wales, faced grave obstacles 
upon its declaration of independence. Although the main and highly beneficial consequence 
of its declaration of independence was the avoidance of being dragged into a protracted 
conflict raging in the south, it had considerable problems of its own. Its territory was 
devastated by a decade of insurgency and war; it did not have any revenues, financial 
institutions, social services, or direct international support; and half of the population was 
displaced or living in refugee camps (Bradbury 2008, 77). In terms of infrastructure 
devastation, Somaliland was faced with an almost insurmountable task of rebuilding: 
 
In Hargeysa, a town of nearly 300,000 people, barely 10% of the structures 
remained intact, leaving only a vast field of blasted rubble strewn with 
explosives. . . . Burco, to the east, had suffered roughly 70% destruction, 
and countless villages in the interior had been razed to the ground. 
Hospitals, schools, clinics and wells had all been destroyed, government 
offices ransacked, bridges blown up, and roads mined and made impassable 
(quoted in Eubank 2012, 468). 
                                                 
14 Al-Shabaab formally joined Al-Qaeda in 2012 (BBC 2012a).  
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Moreover, throughout 1991 and 1992 Somaliland experienced constant intra and inter clan 
fighting, all of which had the potential to further destabilize the country (Ibid. 87-90).  
 
In order to understand much of the rationale for Somaliland’s aspirations towards 
international recognition, and its view that the country “deserves” recognition we need to 
understand the stark contrast between Somaliland and Somalia in terms of internal state-
building developments. The road to peace in Somaliland was paved by many peace and 
reconciliation conferences, and clan elder meetings. Such conferences were concerned with 
constitutional issues and aimed at agreeing a framework for power sharing amongst 
Somaliland’s clans, creating mechanisms for the participation of clan elders in government, 
structuring institutions of government, and establishing ways of maintaining security 
(Bradbury 2008, 96). Amongst others, such conferences and meetings included the 1992 
Tawfiq conference, and the highly significant 1993 Borama conference.15 
 
The Borama Conference, or “Conference of Elders of the Communities of Somaliland”, 
opened in the town of Borama in January 1993, and lasted until May of the same year. This 
conference proved to be, as many have suggested, a watershed moment in the political history 
of Somaliland. Ioan Lewis observed that Borama was a “critical turning point…The most 
original feature here was an imaginative innovation in the form of a bicameral legislature, 
with a non-elected upper house of traditional elders (the gurti) and an elected lower house of 
‘representatives’” (2008, 94). The conference established a framework for managing security 
in Somaliland, advanced a vision of an independent Somaliland, and oversaw the peaceful 
transfer of power from the SNM government to a civilian government. It also established 
three branches of government: an executive comprised of a president, vice-president, and 
council ministers, the already noted bicameral parliament, and an independent judiciary 
(Bradbury 2008, 98-99). 
 
Following almost two years of elder negotiations and small reconciliation meetings, October 
1993 saw the opening of the Sanaag Grand Peace and Reconciliation Conference. This 
conference addressed civil issues and resulted in a peace agreement endorsed by all major 
clans in Somaliland (Bradbury 2008, 101). There is no need to compare the peace conferences 
and various peace and reconciliation initiatives in Somaliland and the south of Somalia. 
Suffice it to say that the former were much more successful than the latter, partially due to 
                                                 
15 The Tawfiq (meaning “understanding” or “consensus” in Somali) conference that took place in October 1992 
brought to an end a very dangerous conflict between the government and local clans over who would enjoy the 
revenues of the port in Berbera. It is seen by some scholars as the beginning of a “revenue bargaining” process in 
which Somaliland’s people began to create more accountable public institutions in return for taxation (Eubank 
2012, 469-471; Bradbury 2008, 96-97). 
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their locally driven and owned organization and program, and lack of outside influences 
which may have exacerbated the conflicts. 
 
While Somaliland did experience a flare up of hostilities and local conflict in late 1994 and 
early 1995 (when sub-clans of the Issaq clan fought over revenues from Hargeisa airport) the 
government has on the whole managed to provide for a large degree of security. As Hagmann 
and Hoehne have illustrated, it is the innovative blend of state and non-state actors (local 
politicians and elders) in local governance that has managed to maintain security in 
Somaliland and allow the government the focus and intervene only on issues of direct threat 
to the stability and integrity of the country as a whole (2009, 49). This stands in stark contrast 
to the situation in most of south and central Somalia, where AMISOM troops battle Al-
Shabaab for supremacy and control of the country, security and governance is generally very 
local and community/clan based, and the only political entity that was able to provide some 
form of trans-local security in the past two decades was briefly the UIC in 2006.  
 
Somalilanders believe they have earned a right to international recognition because of their 
significant achievement in governance and democratization.16 Somaliland currently boasts 
most attributes of a democratic state: a constitution that enables a peaceful transition of 
government (most notably when President Egal died in 2002 and the presidency was legally 
conferred to his vice-president Kahin), and guards civil liberties; a government in which the 
executive and legislative branches have been controlled by different political parties; active 
civic organizations; and a relatively free and independent media (Bradbury 2008, 218; 
Somaliland Times 2002, Hagmann and Hoehne 2009, 52). Independent observers have 
reported favorably on the election processes in Somaliland in 2005 and 2010  and these 
elections have served to further institutionalize Somaliland’s separation from Somalia and 
highlight the gap between Somaliland’s democratically elected governments and Somalia’s 
non-elected TFG (Bradbury 2008, 218; Kibble 2007; Walls and Kibble 2011). Somaliland’s 
government draws its legitimacy from the people, and this is greatly aided by the fact that 
none of the limited amounts of aid reaching Somaliland are administered by the government, 
which has in turn forced Somaliland’s political elites to develop accountable and 
representative institutions (Eubank 2012, 468).  
 
It must be noted that the state-building situation in Somaliland is still in development and 
there remain some significant issues to be worked through: there are problems in aligning the 
                                                 
16 In a 2001 policy document requesting international recognition, the Somaliland Government explained why it 
did not engage with Somalia representatives in negotiations at the 2000 Arta conference in Djibouti, explicitly 
stating that Somaliland “could only cooperate with a counterpart who had attained the same level of stability and 
legality, and who was conducting the affairs of his area through constitutional institutions and a system of justice 
based on established laws” (Somaliland Government 2001, 43). 
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goals and objectives of the elected representatives and non-elected elders in the bicameral 
parliament, issues with recent presidential elections (which include charges of vote rigging 
and problems with the transfer of power), and disputes with the government of Puntland over 
the bordering regions of Sool and Sanaag. However, for such a young democracy with a very 
troubled past, Somaliland has set firm foundations for a successful future. Although the 
country is still faced with international isolation, its example as a stable democracy that has 
survived for twenty years, and a bottom-up locally engineered system of governance that 
highlights the ability of Somali people to govern themselves effectively makes calls for its 
international recognition ever more pressing.  
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3. Theoretical and Legal Framework:  
Statehood and State Recognition theories 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the theoretical and legal frameworks 
which will aid the discussion in the following analytical chapters of the thesis. The 
theoretical framework which discusses state theory allows us to introduce key concepts 
which aid the understanding of state recognition in general, and Somaliland’s situation in 
particular. Theoretical considerations are important in illuminating the political dynamics of 
state recognition, and why some countries receive formal recognition while others do not. On 
the other hand, the legal framework of statehood is important because it allows an 
understanding of how statehood can be attained, and how the criteria for statehood (as found 
in international law) influence a territory’s international status and chances for formal 
recognition.  
 
3.1 The State and the changing idea of statehood 
 
What is a state, and how a state could or should be defined in contemporary times is a topic 
of great complexity, which by itself warrants a separate thesis. The modern notion of what 
statehood entails is heavily influenced by the idea of Westphalian sovereignty, and Max 
Webber’s writings on social organization. Westphalian sovereignty is considered to have 
provided the foundations of modern state sovereignty. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia which 
ended Europe’s Thirty Years War is seen by political scientists, especially scholars of 
International Relations, as a key turning point in modern history and the formation of the 
modern state (Osiander 2001, 260-261).17 The Peace of Westphalia ushered in an era of 
territorial sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the state; a foundation of 
state sovereignty still adhered to today (Geldenhuys 2009, 14). 
 
Max Weber’s rather realist concept of the state is famous: “A compulsory political 
association with continuous organization will be called a ‘state’ if and in so far as its 
administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force in the enforcement of its order” (1947, 154). As Jackson and Rosberg note “A 
definition of the state primarily in terms of means rather than ends-particularly the means of 
force-emphasizes the empirical rather than the juridical, the de facto rather than the de jure, 
attributes of statehood” (1982, 2). While Weber’s definition of what statehood entails does 
not overlook the juridical aspects of statehood, his famous emphasis on a “monopoly of 
                                                 
17 While scholars of International Relations still generally subscribe to the view that the Peace of Westphalia was 
a turning point and birth of modern state sovereignty there have been serious criticisms that challenge this view. 
Osiander’s article is highly critical of the “Westphalian Myth” of state sovereignty, and he offers interesting 
arguments for revising the importance of the Westphalian Peace for modern state sovereignty. 
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legitimate violence” as a strong determinant of statehood is not without its problems, 
especially in the discussion of state formation in the African context.  
 
At least since the 1980s, scholars of International Relations and political science have 
examined the traditional, Weberian idea of statehood, contrasting it with the empirical 
developments in state formation and statehood in many parts of the world. In the early 1980s 
Jackson and Rosberg wrote that “By Weber’s definition, a few of Africa’s governments 
would not qualify as states-at least not all of the time-because they cannot always effectively 
claim to have monopoly of force throughout their territorial jurisdiction” (1982, 3). While 
one could academically argue that many Western, wealthy developed states also can not, all 
of the time, claim a monopoly of force over their territories (as organised crime or terrorism, 
for example, often challenge that monopoly), the situation in several African states is 
particularly acute. 
 
The idea of what constitutes a state is an evolving one, and states are not definitively given 
political organizations that have existed from the first day of human history. As with many 
other aspects of human organization, states also evolve, and in the past twenty years there has 
been a flurry of scholarly writings on failed, collapsed, quasi, empirical, shadow, or weak 
states, and how states are imagined, negotiated, and formed. While there is no room here to 
offer an in-depth overview of such writings, it is important to outline some influential ideas 
which are of particular relevance for the changing ideas of statehood in Africa; especially the 
Somali territories.  
 
The international political system we live in is extremely state-centric. States form the main 
building blocs of the international order and are the only internationally accepted and 
recognized form of socio-political organization on any given geographic territory. However, 
it is also widely believed that states should be formed in a certain way, and should provide 
certain goods to their populations. This is why much of the literature on international 
relations and political science is state-centric and Western-centred; it assumes that all states 
will follow a similar developmental trajectory, which will in the long run “converge towards 
a model of Western liberal democracy” (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009, 43). As Hagmann and 
Hoehne have argued, this “state convergence” thesis leads  
 
to the biased notion that the modern state as it has developed in Europe and 
North America over recent centuries is ‘accomplished’, ‘mature’, and 
‘stable’, while the state in other regions of the world is ‘undeveloped’, ‘pre-
modern’ and ‘fragile’. Thereby, ‘the state’ becomes a reified idea, a ‘thing’, 
which is a priori assumed and taken for granted (Ibid., 45). 
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While it is true that “contemporary African statehood is ‘weaker’ when compared to 
European statehood and when evaluated against the background of an ideal-typical, rational-
legal state apparatus as described by Weber”, and that the state-centric literature has merits in 
re-emphasizing “the vital role of public authority and institutions in furthering peace, 
development and prosperity”, this is not to say that a state-centric view of political 
organization does not have its limitations in explaining empirical state formation 
developments in many African countries (Ibid., 43). It is important to understand that one of 
the main drawbacks of state-centred theories of political organization (especially in Africa) is 
that they assume that the absence of central state authority, or state collapse, will inevitably 
give rise to anarchy, societal breakdown, and political and security chaos.18 
 
In terms of what constitutes a state and how come so many weak African states, which do not 
exercise a monopoly over violence in their territorial jurisdictions, still exist, Jackson and 
Rosberg differentiated empirical and juridical statehood. They argued that many African 
states were empirically weak or underdeveloped, and that juridical statehood (the 
international community’s rigid insistence on recognising territories after de-colonization 
regardless of their statehood ability or viability) is more important than empirical statehood 
in accounting for the persistence of states in Africa (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 12, 21). This 
means that the international community of states can not imagine a way of officially dealing 
with territories if they are not socio-politically constituted as states; a fact that can certainly 
be seen from the Somali case, where the Republic of Somalia’s empirical statehood is almost 
non-existent, yet its juridical statehood is virtually intact, thereby allowing it international 
representation and the benefits of membership in various international organizations. 
 
However, in the past twenty or so years there have been attempts by scholars to re-
conceptualize the state, or better said state formation, in a way that emphasizes the fluidity of 
state-building and the “degrees of statehood”. Christopher Clapham has argued that in light 
of a growing inability of governments around the world (especially Africa) to formally 
control their territories, the heavy emphasis and insistence by intellectuals and diplomats on 
the reasserted primacy of statehood in understanding such developments should be 
reassessed (1998, 156).  As Clapham concludes 
 
African states have shown a remarkable capacity, not only for survival, but 
for revival from apparently terminal decay. The new post-Cold War global 
order, of which Africa forms an exceptional but particularly interesting part, 
is not, however, crisply divided into entities which do and do not count as 
                                                 
18 One of the most prominent authors on state failure and collapse, Robert I. Rothberg, argues that “A collapsed 
state exhibits a vacuum of authority. It is a mere geographical expression, a black hole into which a failed polity 
has fallen” (Rotberg 2004, 9); for a view equating state failure with anarchy see Robert D. Kaplan’s 1994 often 
cited article „The Coming Anarchy”. 
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‘states’. It consists instead of a mass of power structures which, regardless 
of formal designation, enjoy greater or lesser degrees of statehood (Ibid., 
157). 
 
In other words, formal designations of state and non-state mean very little in the empirical 
world where state formation is not a single event, but takes place over time, constantly 
changing. Such ideas have been echoed in a recent discussion by Hagmann and Peclard who 
examine how states are “negotiated” in Africa, and in which ways we should understand state 
formation on the continent. For Hagmann and Peclard (2010) negotiating statehood refers to 
the processes of state (de)construction which is not linear in evolution, but rather constant; in 
this they follow Christian Lund (2006, 697) who argues that “public authority — or 
‘stateness’ — can wax and wane”, and “state institutions are never definitively formed” but 
follow a constant process of formation. 
 
Many scholars writing on state-building have used the Somali region as a great example of 
how these state formation processes evolve. Ken Menkhaus has demonstrated how south 
Somalia has seen an increase in fluid, locally developed, non-state governance systems made 
up of local businessmen, Islamic clerics, and militias, which have enjoyed significant 
amounts of popular legitimacy and provided security and fostered economic participation in 
their communities (Menkhaus 1995, 1998, 2004, 2006). Hagmann and Hoehne (2009) have 
illustrated how state-building and the provision of public goods (such as security) in 
Somaliland and Puntland have been greatly aided by non-state actors and local communities, 
and that peace and state-building processes in these territories have been successful because 
of their bottom-up structure. According to Hagmann and Hoehne it is important that 
prevailing political orders and variegated degrees of statehood in Africa are understood as 
they are, not as they are wished to be, and that there should be an increasing recognition and 
participation of sub-national units (breakaway regions or simply units such as towns or 
regions that have been largely abandoned by their own central government) in international 
politics, because “whether we like it or not, current types of African statehood, often 
considered to be pre-modern aberrations, may well in the end endure and even become 
models for future political orders” (2009, 54). 
 
After having outlined the theoretical foundations for understanding the changing idea of 
statehood and state-formation we should now attempt to apply it to Somaliland and Somalia. 
What this brief exposition of the changing ways in which states can be understood highlights 
is that there is no concrete and monolithic theory of what constitutes a state. However, no 
matter what ideological or theoretical framework one accepts in dealing with a state which 
has lost all or most of its state-like characteristics and can not fund itself, provide security for 
its population, exert trans-local political influence over its territory, or keep its boundaries 
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and therefore its sovereignty intact or protected, one should accept that such a political entity 
is no longer viable. Therefore, taking into account that there exist in Somalia a multitude of 
local and regional governance structures which provide some form of political and security 
order to local communities, this paper nevertheless accepts that Somalia as a state-like 
political entity with national and international sovereignty no longer exists. 
 
The TFG of Somalia is treated as a legitimate government of an internationally recognized 
country, yet has been largely unsuccessful in its attempts at state-building and creating a 
unitary Somali state. Somaliland, on the other hand, has for the most part of its past twenty 
years provided basic public goods and service on a national basis, and in line with Hagmann 
and Hoehne’s (2009) arguments can be seen as a successful project in bottom-up locally 
owned governance that should be extended more recognition in international politics. The 
differences between these two territories in the realm of state-building are even more stark 
when compared to each other, and we can surmise that the real politico-empirical basis for 
Somaliland’s aspirations to international recognition lies in its ability to provide local and 
national governance, re-build its infrastructure, foster economic activity, and in effect give 
birth to a locally popular and legitimate state; something Somalia is yet to achieve. 
Somaliland therefore does, at least most of the time, conform to Weber’s notions of statehood, 
and in terms of Jackson and Rosberg’s views, does exercises strong empirical statehood. 
 
3.2 State Recognition Theories 
 
The underlying argument of this thesis and an important aspect of the examination of 
Somaliland’s independence bid is that state recognition is not a legal act, but a highly political 
one. This is to say that the recognition of newly formed or secessionist states is not governed 
or mandated by legal requirements, but by political considerations. This is arguably the most 
significant reason why state recognition is such a complex issue. 
 
The reason why state recognition is primarily a political and not legal act is because there is 
no international body or law which regulates state recognition. As Dugard and Raič state 
 
In the absence of any international authority charged with the task of 
determining whether an entity claiming to be a State in fact complies with 
the above requirements, it is for each State or international organisation to 
make such a determination on the available factual information and on its 
own assessment of whether the new entity should be admitted to the 
community of nations (2006, 96-97). 
 
Such a view was also expressed some three decades ago when in 1976 the United States 
Department of State noted that “[i]n the view of the United States, international law does not 
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require a state to recognise another entity as a state; it is a matter for the judgment of each 
state whether an entity merits recognition as a state” (quoted in Shaw 2003, 374). There is no 
transnational body (such as for example the UN) that would dictate which states should be 
recognised, and state recognition remains firmly a prerogative exercised at the discretion of 
each independent state. This is why, for example, a country or territory like Kosovo can be at 
the same time recognised and not recognised by European Union states that ascribe to similar 
recognition criteria for new states yet differ markedly in their application of such criteria.   
 
Legal scholars are today generally in agreement that state recognition is a political issue. In 
his seminal textbook on International Law, the legal scholar and barrister Malcolm N. Shaw 
states that “In more cases than not the decision whether or not to recognise will depend more 
upon political considerations than exclusively legal factors” (2003, 368). He reiterates this 
point by arguing that “Of course, recognition is highly political and is given in a number of 
cases for purely political reasons” (Ibid., 369). Other scholars such as Dugard and Raič argue 
that  
States do not regard themselves as being under a legal duty to recognise 
entities as States once they comply with the requirements of statehood… it 
is essential to appreciate that political considerations do influence the 
decision and may prompt a State to recognise an entity prematurely or to 
refuse to grant it recognition (2006, 98). 
 
Because there is no legal framework or law that governs state recognition, would-be states 
have to take into consideration political calculations when seeking international recognition. 
As Deon Geldenhuys concludes “recognition is a matter of political discretion, not a legal or 
moral duty” (Geldenhuys 2009, 42). 
 
The legal scholar Malcolm N. Shaw, states that “recognition is a statement by an international 
legal person as to the status in international law of another real or alleged international legal 
person or of the validity of a particular factual situation” (2003, 368). This means that when a 
state recognises another, it is confirming the legal existence of that state. The act of 
recognition does not imply that a state did not actually exist in real life prior to recognition, 
merely that by recognising it, other states have “endowed” it with legal existence. So, one 
may argue, state recognition is in many cases a mere “official” recognition that a state indeed 
does exist. This leads us to the two predominant theories of state recognition. 
 
Because recognition is a method of accepting certain factual situations and endowing them 
with legal significance there are two main ways of viewing state recognition: constitutive and 
declaratory recognition (Shaw 2003, 185; Dugard and Raič 2006, 97). The former theory 
maintains that it is only through recognition that a state comes into being under international 
law, whereas the latter theory maintains that once the factual criteria of statehood have been 
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satisfied, a new state exists as an international person, recognition becoming merely a political 
and not a legal act in this context (Shaw 2003, 185). These two theories can be aptly 
examined in the cases of Somalia and Somaliland. 
 
As already noted, the TFG of Somalia is currently the internationally recognised and backed 
government of Somalia. As a result of its recognition, and as far as international law is 
concerned Somalia as a state does indeed exist. This is why it still occupies a seat at the 
United Nations General Assembly, the African Union Assembly, the Arab League Assembly, 
is a member of the World Bank, and is awarded full diplomatic status in international and 
diplomatic exchanges and conferences, and can apply for international aid and funding. The 
fact that Somalia as a state does not meet many of the internationally accepted statehood 
criteria (discussed in section 3.3 below), and can hardly be called sovereign or independent 
has so far not influenced its statehood status. The TFG was born at an international 
conference sponsored by countries from the region and Western donors;19 is not a 
democratically elected government of Somalia and does not enjoy much popular backing or 
legitimacy; is almost completely dependant on foreign financial support for its existence; has 
very little control over revenue collection in the country; and perhaps most importantly does 
not even control the whole of Mogadishu (let alone south and central Somalia) and is almost 
completely dependant on AU military troops for the provision of security. However, Somalia 
is a state because it has been “recognised” as a state, and presents a good example of 
constitutive recognition. 
 
On the other hand we have Somaliland which presents a clear case of a factual state which 
conforms to all generally accepted statehood criteria, but as an internationally recognised state 
does not exist. Somaliland re-asserted its independence in 1991 after three decades of union 
with Somalia. Its current borders correspond to those it received upon independence from 
Britain in 1960 and the government is generally in control of those borders. The government 
of Somaliland has been elected in popular democratic elections four times now, and 
represents the general will of the majority of its population. Somaliland does not qualify for 
foreign assistance and due to its non-recognition can not apply to multilateral organisations 
for funding. As a result it has had to fund itself for the past twenty years without much foreign 
assistance, a matter in sharp contrast to its southern neighbour. Somaliland has the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states, and already has diplomatic missions in Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, the United Kingdom, Yemen, Kenya, the United States, South Africa, Sweden, and 
Norway (Clapham et. al. 2011, 22). It regularly hosts officials from neighbouring and other 
countries, and its own officials regularly travel abroad. While Somaliland is not labelled a 
                                                 
19 For an analysis of some major problems with the creation of the TFG in Somalia see Terlinden and Hagmann 
2005, 9. 
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“state”, it is a de facto state and according to the declaratory theory of recognition, its 
recognition would only confirm an already existing situation.20  
 
What these two examples highlight, and what has already been mentioned, is that state 
recognition is a complex issue, and above all one dominated primarily by political 
considerations. As Mark Bradbury has noted  
 
There is an irony that while Somaliland has demonstrated a high degree of 
empirical statehood, it lacks juridical sovereignty. In contrast, while Somalia 
lacks empirical sovereignty, international political and development policies 
treat its juridical sovereignty as intact…At the end of the day, a resolution of 
Somaliland’s status is likely to be influenced by ‘realpolitik’ and ‘real-
economic’ rather than legal arguments in an international court (2008, 249). 
 
In line with the realities of the links between state recognition and political considerations it is 
also important to note that in practice there is an integral relationship between recognition and 
the criteria for statehood in the sense that the more overwhelming the scale of international 
recognition is in any given situation, the less it is demanded that a would-be state 
demonstrates fulfilment of statehood criteria. Conversely, the sparser international recognition 
is, the more attention will be focused upon proof of actual fulfilment of such statehood criteria 
(Shaw 2003, 186). 
 
3.3 Statehood Criteria 
 
While it is not the purpose of this section to give an exhaustive examination of what 
constitutes statehood and the academic debates on this question, the following pages will 
provide a brief but thorough discussion of the main generally accepted criteria for statehood. 
What criteria a territory should fulfil in order to be considered or recognised as a state is an 
issue that strikes at the very heart of the question of what constitutes a state. Any 
consideration of the formal requirements of statehood has to begin with what is known as the 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. Adopted at the 1933 International 
Conference of American States held in the Uruguayan capital, the Declaration reflects 
customary international law on what constitutes a state (Geldenhuys 2009, 8). As Shaw 
states, Article 1 of the Convention lays down the most “widely accepted formulation of the 
criteria of statehood in international law” (2003, 178). According to Article 1 “The state as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent 
                                                 
20 Pegg defines de facto states as “entities which feature long-term, effective, and popularly supported organized 
political leaderships that provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area. They 
seek international recognition and view themselves as capable of meeting the obligations of sovereign statehood. 
They are, however, unable to secure widespread juridical recognition and therefore function outside the 
boundaries of international legitimacy” (quoted in Hagmann and Hoehne 2009, 44, note 4). 
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population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with 
the other states”. 
 
Although Montevideo Convention is not without its problems and limitations, it still serves 
as a good starting point for discussions about statehood. There is no need here to discuss the 
Montevideo criteria at length as they will be discussed with particular relevance to 
Somaliland in chapter four; however a general outline will be provided. In terms of a 
permanent population the Montevideo Convention does not define the minimum population a 
state must have (as can be seen from the cases of many Caribbean or Pacific island states 
which while small in population are still considered states). As far as territory is concerned 
this is a requirement which allows other states to understand from which territory the new 
state would likely operate, or should be based in. However, as Shaw argues,  
 
There is no necessity in international law for defined and settled boundaries. 
A state may be recognised as a legal person even though it is involved in a 
dispute with its neighbours as to the precise demarcation of its frontiers, so 
long as there is a consistent band of territory which is undeniably controlled 
by the government of the alleged state (2003, 179). 
 
The requirement of having a government may seem self-explanatory and it relates to an 
expectation that states are run by some form of centralised political authority. While this does 
not rule out federal arrangements or confederations, it should be “regarded more as an 
indication of some sort of coherent political structure and society, than the necessity for a 
sophisticated apparatus of executive and legislative organs” (Ibid., 180).  
 
The final requirement of having the “capacity to enter into relations with the other states” is 
an important one. This requirement strikes at the core of three other issues which also help 
determine statehood: recognition, sovereignty and independence. Shaw observes that 
 
The capacity to enter into relations with other states is an aspect of the 
existence of the entity in question as well as an indication of the importance 
attached to recognition by other countries. It is a capacity not limited to 
sovereign nations, since both international organisations and non-
independent states can enter into legal relations with other entities under the 
rules of international law. But it is essential for a sovereign state to be able 
to create such legal relations with other units as it sees fit. Where this is not 
present, the entity cannot be an independent state. The concern here is not 
with political pressure by one country over another, but rather the lack of 
competence to enter into legal relations. The difference is the presence or 
absence of legal capacity, not the degree of influence that may affect 
decisions. The essence of such capacity is independence. This is crucial to 
statehood and amounts to a conclusion of law in the light of particular 
circumstances. It is a formal statement that the state is subject to no other 
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sovereignty and is unaffected either by factual dependence upon other states 
or by submission to the rules of international laws (Ibid., 181). 
 
Although independence and sovereignty do not feature explicitly in the Montevideo criteria, 
as noted above, they are implicit in a state’s abilities to enter relations with other states. 
Moreover, these two additional requirements are also key in determining statehood. While 
there is no set definition of sovereignty, international legal and political scholars generally 
divide it into external and internal components (Geldenhuys 2009, 14). External components 
of sovereignty and independence would include a state’s ability and freedom to determine 
relations with other states freely and without restraint or control, while internal sovereignty 
allows states exclusive rights to determine the character of domestic institutions and enact 
and enforce laws while at the same time not having such activities dictated by other states or 
international entities (Ibid., 14-15). Naturally what these components of sovereignty or 
independence refer to is constitutional independence (i.e. a legally enshrined right to act 
independently) because in practice, the actions of many states are very often influenced or 
even dictated by foreign entities such as other states or international organisations. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that while many states have not developed any additional criteria 
for state recognition (and to a large extent still rely on the Montevideo Convention), the 
European Union has in light of the breakups of the USSR and Yugoslavia devised an 
important addition. In December 1991 the European Community produced and adopted two 
documents governing statehood recognition: the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the Declaration on Yugoslavia (European 
Union 1991). Going well beyond the Montevideo criteria, the European Community decided 
that recognition of new states emerging from the disintegration of existing countries in the 
region would depend also on the nature of their political structures and practices. The 
aspirant states were expected to respect established borders, observe human rights and 
democracy, uphold the rule of law, guarantee minority rights, commit themselves to settle 
disputes peacefully, and accept nuclear non-proliferation (Geldenhuys 2009, 20). So in 
addition to the rather physical or material aspects of the Montevideo criteria for statehood, 
what the European Union did was add some more normative criteria which territories should 
fulfil if they desire to be recognised as states by European Union countries. These then 
represent the main statehood criteria available in international legal documents and should 
help us understand how territories can be considered states, and which formal requirements 
statehood is generally based upon. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has outlined a theoretical framework for conceptualizing Somaliland as a state 
and understanding the subsequent discussion of the complexities and issues dominating 
Somaliland’s international recognition. It has offered an outline of the changing ideas of what 
constitutes statehood, and has observed that Somaliland can be considered a state because it 
empirically fulfils traditional notions of statehood as espoused by Weber, and scholars such as 
Jackson and Rosberg. 
 
In terms of state recognition theories, the chapter discussed the constitutive and declaratory 
theories and applied them briefly to the examples of Somalia and Somaliland in order to 
highlight their conceptual worth in explaining and understanding the complexities of 
international state recognition. 
 
This chapter has also examined the main, and most widely accepted statehood criteria found 
in international law. These criteria include mainly the Montevideo Convention provisions on 
statehood, but certain countries have also adopted additional criteria which govern their 
recognition of new states. The importance of these statehood criteria will be highlighted in 
chapter four when Somaliland’s statehood is discussed in more detail. 
 
Finally, this chapter has argued that one of the main reasons why state recognition can be such 
a complicated issue is because there are no legal provisions governing the process of state 
recognition, and there is no international organization which would oversee such a process. 
The practice of state recognition involves each individual state acting separately or through a 
multilateral organization, extending formal recognition to an aspiring would-be state after it is 
satisfied that such a territory fulfils generally accepted statehood criteria. However, this is not 
to say that all states always extend formal recognition to territories which fulfil statehood 
criteria, as the very existence of Jackson and Rosberg’s empirical and juridical statehood 
clearly demonstrates. 
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4. Not opening a “Pandora’s Box”:  
Analyzing the legal case for Somaliland’s independence 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze how valid Somaliland’s case for independence and 
recognition is according to internationally accepted criteria for state secession. While states 
around the world, especially those in Africa, are always weary of state secession and 
recognizing breakaway political entities, there is nevertheless, a long history of acceptable 
state secession. In fact, it can be argued that since the end of the 1980s, most newly 
independent states have come about as a result of state secession.21 However, before exploring 
the legalities of Somaliland’s secession it is important to ask why Somaliland would want to 
seek independence and an end to its union with Somalia. While many scholars writing on the 
issue of Somaliland’s independence examine and discuss the legal questions related to 
secession and independence, not many actually seek to understand why it is that Somaliland 
declared independence in the first place. 
 
4.1 Introducing a case for Somaliland’s independence 
 
In 2001 the Somaliland government published a document - Somaliland: Demand for 
International Recognition - outlining the country’s reasons for independence. Aside from 
discussing the legalities of its right to independence, the Somaliland government also 
discusses the reasons why it undertook such a step. As already recounted in chapter two, 
arranging the union between Somaliland and Somalia was not without problems. Somaliland 
and Somalia were administered by two different colonial powers with very different colonial 
administrations; as a result the newly created Republic of Somalia inherited many 
administrative problems. In June 1961 problems started to surface with the national 
referendum to approve the new republic’s constitution. In the north, the major political party 
(Somali National League) boycotted the referendum, and the majority of the population voted 
against it. Some sixty percent of the overall Somaliland population opposed the new 
constitution; seventy two percent in Hargeisa, sixty percent in Berbera, sixty six percent in 
Burao, and sixty nine percent in Erigavo (Somaliland Government 2001, 16).  
 
An important reason why Somalilanders would have felt aggrieved was the political and 
economic marginalisation they felt in the new Somalia. As Hussein M. Adam has argued  
 
Right at the outset, the Somali sense of proportional balance was ignored. The 
south provided the capital city, the anthem, the flag and constitution. The 
parliament elected a southern president who nominated a southern prime 
                                                 
21 Some examples would include Timor-Leste, all previous Yugoslav republics, Kosovo, South Sudan, and 
Eritrea. It is also important to note that some new states have come about as a result of union dissolution (and not 
secession), such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
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minister. His cabinet included four northern ministers out of fourteen. 
Southerners occupied key ministries such as Foreign, Interior and Finance. The 
ex-northern premier was appointed Minster of Education. The posts of Army 
Commander and Police Commander went to southern officers…(1994, 24). 
 
This political marginalization would have been felt especially amongst the previous ruling 
elites of the north who had now lost their privileged position enjoyed since the days of the 
British occupation. 
 
Another important reason why the north would seek independence from the south is the 
malignant record of Siyad Barre’s murderous regime, especially from the late 1980s and his 
war against the SNM (Somaliland Government 2001, 19-25). The already mentioned harsh 
administration of the north from the mid 1980s, coupled with the 1988 bombings which 
reduced Hargeisa to rubble left a lasting impression on the population. Issaq dominated 
northerners were terrorized by the Barre regime throughout the 1980s, and this contributed to 
a large extent to the dislike and animosity felt towards the south. 
 
This leads us to the fall of the Barre regime in 1991, and Somaliland’s declaration of 
independence. Seeing what Somalia descended into following Barre’s demise (coupled with 
what it constituted during the last ten years of his rule) it is not difficult to see why 
Somaliland would want to separate itself. Somalilanders may not have actually realized what 
their independence declaration meant at the time, and it is possible that they had intended to 
re-join Somalia at a future date when the situation in the south improved. Certainly, it is 
difficult to accept that back in 1991 Somaliland leaders could have known that the political 
anarchy and warlord infighting plaguing Somalia would last over a decade. However, 
whether they understood that at the time or not, by declaring independence, Somalilanders 
benefited from a cessation of warfare and an inclusive peace-building and reconciliation 
process which paved the way for state development and relatively widespread peace and 
security; a feat the south is yet to achieve. 
 
However, one important issue must be highlighted when dealing with Somaliland’s stance on 
independence, and its demands for international recognition. When reading the Demand for 
International Recognition policy document it must be remembered that some parts of it could 
have been written with hindsight, and we can not exclude that the significance of some 
events or occurrences has been accentuated in order to justify the political elite’s drive for 
independence. In many regards, the document highlights how Somalilanders were suffering 
“from the beginning” and were never really enthusiastic about their union with Somalia. 
Histories are often re-written by political regimes in order to show justification for previous 
or subsequent actions or policies. While this does not mean that Somalilanders and the north 
did not genuinely suffer hardships and marginalization in the union (they definitely did suffer 
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significant material devastation in Barre’s war with the SNM), neither does it mean that the 
south was “from the beginning” of the union really determined to systematically marginalize 
northerners. What this policy document does reflect, and what in no way diminishes its 
importance, is at least the “official” perception of northerners (or the Somaliland 
government) that they were marginalized in the union with Somalia and that it was in their 
best interest to leave that union. 
 
4.2 “The Union itself was faulty” 
 
Since 1991 and Somaliland’s declaration of independence there have been several reports and 
scholarly and legal articles written on the legalities of its secession and independence 
declaration, and how it fits in with international law (for example, Carroll & Rajagopal 1993, 
ICG 2006, Eggers 2007, Roethke 2011). While it is not the purpose of this section to offer an 
exhaustive assessment of international law on the questions of secession, territorial integrity, 
and self-determination of peoples, it is important to understand the strength of some of the 
legal arguments for Somaliland’s independence. As noted in chapter three, questions of 
secession and independence are heavily politicized, and do not necessarily concern only legal 
matters. However, it is always important to have a grasp of key legal arguments in any debate 
on state independence and secession. 
 
Before discussing Somaliland’s secession and independence it is important to point out that 
international law “does not grant sub-state entities a general right to secede from their parent 
states, nor does it prohibit secession” (Roethke 2011, 38).22 That is to say, international law 
does not explicitly allow or forbid secession. This is important because it contributes to the 
general complexity of international recognition of secessionist states, especially when dealing 
with issues of self-determination and territorial integrity. It can be argued that in the Somali 
context, the right of Somalilanders for self-determination and independence is in direct 
conflict with Somalia’s territorial integrity. This would be so, if not for several important 
factors discussed below. 
 
A day after Somaliland gained its independence, 27 June 1960, the country’s Legislative 
Assembly passed the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law which was to be signed by 
representatives of the south (Somalia). This was to be the international treaty signed by both 
states allowing them to form a union. However, this treaty was never signed, and on 30 June 
1960 the Legislative Assembly of Somalia approved a significantly different document, the 
Attio di Unione (Act of Union) as the treaty documenting the union of the two territories 
(Somaliland Government 2001, 47; Carroll and Rajagopal 1993, 660-661). In January 1961, 
                                                 
22 Or as Dugard and Raič put it (2006, 102): “One will search in vain for an explicit prohibition of unilateral 
secession in international instruments. The same is true for the explicit recognition of such a right”. 
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half a year later, the National Assembly of the newly formed Republic of Somalia proclaimed 
a new Act of Union repealing the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law, and making this Act 
of Union retroactive as of 1 July 1960 (Carroll and Rajagopal 1993, 661).23 However, what 
this in effect meant is that the basis for unification between the two states was never legally 
valid; a fact that can be proved by two examples. 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, in December 1961 there was an attempted military coup by 
junior officers in the north. The coup failed and the military officers were arrested and tried 
for treason. However, in stead of receiving lengthy prison sentences or worse, the officers 
were acquitted. The presiding judge dismissed the treason charges on the grounds that since 
there was no valid Act of Union between the two states, the court (in Mogadishu) had no 
jurisdiction over Somaliland (Somaliland Government 2001, 17; Bradbury 2008, 33). 
Therefore, even two years after the passing of the retroactive Act of Union in 1961, the legal 
minds in Somalia were aware of the invalidity of this Act of Union. As Carroll and Rajagopal 
have concluded, the unification effort between Somaliland and Somalia “fell short of the legal 
requirements mandated by domestic and international law” (1993, 662). The international 
aspect of the failure of the union between the two states brings us to the second point. 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the main internationally accepted law 
governing treaties between states) stipulates in Article 24. 2 that “a treaty enters into force as 
soon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States”. 
Since Somaliland did not sign the Act of Union drafted by the south, and Somalia did not sign 
the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law drafted by the north, it would appear that both 
formal agreements lack consent by the other party, rendering them invalid. To this should be 
added that Article 60.1 of the same convention allows for parties to bilateral treaties to invoke 
breach of Treaty as grounds for its termination. Even if the Act of Union were valid, 
Somaliland could “plausibly argue in the alternative that material breaches of the treaty under 
the dictatorship allow the North to terminate the agreement” (Roethke 2011, 44). As Roethke 
notes  
 
Both the Law of Union and the Act of Union structured the new Somali state 
within a constitutional framework. In 1969, however, the constitutional order 
was overthrown and a military dictatorship installed. Although the actor 
breaching the treaty was a military leader, not a signatory to either treaty, 
Somaliland could maintain that the conditions under which it agreed to unite 
with Italian Somalia no longer existed, thereby terminating their agreement 
(Ibid.). 
 
                                                 
23 This move was disliked in the north and its unpopularity can partially be seen by Somaliland’s subsequent 
rejection of the Constitution in the already mentioned 1961 referendum. 
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From the above noted we can draw one significant conclusion: it is highly possible that the 
original union between Somaliland and Somalia was invalid according to domestic and 
international laws that govern such treaties. Since both parties did not sign the other’s union 
treaty, they in effect have no legal validity in the same way a sales contract between two 
parties has no legal validity unless actually signed by both parties.  
 
4.3 Somalilanders as a “peoples” 
 
Going back to that question of self-determination vs. territorial integrity, it is also possible to 
argue that, for example, the declaration of Somaliland’s independence violates Somalia’s 
territorial integrity. Two factors should be noted here. For one, it is the practice of the 
international community (namely the United Nations) that when claims of territorial integrity 
clash with those of self-determination, the latter trump the former (Carroll and Rajagopal 
1993, 680). This is a point corroborated by de-colonization movements around the world after 
World War Two, the breakdown of the USSR and Yugoslavia, or most recently the 
independence of Kosovo. 
 
In order to discuss self-determination, it should be first examined whether Somalilanders can 
be considered a “peoples”. Much ink has been used on outlining how self-determination can 
come about, under which circumstances people can rebel or secede from an existing political 
authority, and if their course of action is “legal”. The Preamble to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights recognizes the right to rebel against a government guilty of egregious 
violations of human rights (quoted in Carroll and Rajagopal 1993, 664). Furthermore, if the 
political establishment of a certain country engages in violating human rights on a genocidal 
scale, the people may claim right to self-determination through secession (Ibid.). This right to 
self determination acquires even greater legitimacy “if the pattern of human rights violations 
indicates an attempt by the state to decimate a distinctly identifiable group” (Ibid., 665). Siyad 
Barre’s terror and violence unleashed against the northern based Issaq clan is amply 
documented and his particular targeting of Issaq Somalilanders gives them cause for self-
determination. Barre’s regime armed Ogadeni militias and sent them to fight the Issaq 
dominated SNM and “by violently supporting one clan over another, the Somali government 
clearly distinguished between certain Somalis whose rights it respected and others whose 
rights it did not” (Roethke 2011, 45). Therefore, if the Somali government under Barre 
considered the Issaq a distinguishable group of people it could specifically target, then this 
gives the Issaq grounds on which they can be considered a “peoples” worth self-
determination.  
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However, the status of Somalilanders as a “peoples” is not really key for the legal validity of 
their secession. We can plausibly argue that if Somaliland had “achieved independence from 
Britain and become a sovereign state in its own right through the normal process of 
decolonization, the question of whether Somalilanders were a “people” would therefore be a 
moot point” (Roethke 2011, 43). Since Somaliland was an independent state for four days, 
Somalilanders as a “people” did exist. When in June 2006 Montenegrins voted for a 
dissolution of their union with Serbia, they were welcomed in the world as a sovereign and 
independent state, the UN’s 192nd  member. However, the question of whether Montenegrins 
are a “peoples” distinct from Serbs is far from settled, and it seemed to bother no one in the 
international community that a peoples who share the same language, religion, and culture as 
Serbs were exercising their right to self-determination. That Montenegro and Serbia ended 
their union with a referendum is of no significance for the present discussion; what is 
important is that, like Somalilanders, Montenegrins share almost all ethnic and cultural 
characteristics of their neighbors, yet their right to self-determination received little 
questioning. 
 
4.4 The Montevideo criteria for statehood: Is Somaliland a state? 
 
As outlined in chapter three, the most broadly accepted definition of statehood, albeit overly 
simplistic and with its own range of shortcomings, is the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States (ICG 2006, 10). Article 1 of the Convention states that “the state 
as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent 
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with 
the other states”. Several scholars writing on Somaliland’s independence agree that according 
to these criteria, Somaliland can indeed be considered a state (Eggers 2007, 218-219; 
Geldenhuys 2009, 135-136; Clapham et. al. 2011, 9).  
 
Somaliland has a permanent population estimated between 2.5 and 3.75 million (Eggers 2007, 
218; ICG 2006, 11; Somaliland Ministry of Planning and Development 2010, 3). Although 
some of the population is pastoralist and crosses Somaliland’s borders frequently, the majority 
of it is stable, especially since the growth of urbanization in Hargeisa. This population 
confirmed its support for independence in the 2001 Constitutional Referendum. 
 
Somaliland’s territory is clearly defined  by three colonial treaties from the 19th century 
(Anglo-French 1888, Anglo-Italian 1894, and Anglo-Ethiopian 1897), and the boundaries of 
that territory encompass an area roughly 137 600 square kilometres bordering the Red Sea 
and Gulf of Aden, Djibouti, Ethiopia, south Somalia, and Puntland (ICG 2006, 11). While the 
Somaliland government is in effective control of most of its territory, its boundaries are 
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contested internally in the north-east, especially in the Sool and Sanaag regions bordering 
Puntland (Geldenhuys 2009, 135). 
 
Somaliland’s government has been popularly and democratically elected in several elections 
since 1991, and the country exhibits most traits of a sovereign state: it has a national currency, 
flag, anthem, and constitution. So far, all parliamentarian and presidential elections have 
ended with a peaceful transition of power and this in itself is a trait not many countries in the 
region can boast. There is also a functioning national army and police force, and a relatively 
independent judiciary and bicameral parliament. 
 
Somaliland’s capacity to enter into relations with other states is significantly obstructed and 
constrained by the lack of international recognition, but it has nevertheless managed to 
undertake a vital diplomatic effort. While there are no formal diplomatic ties with other states, 
Somaliland has the capacity to undertake them (Eggers 2007, 219). Several African countries 
accept Somaliland officials entering on Somaliland travel documents, and the Somaliland 
government has engaged in trade and diplomatic relations via liaison offices in Ethiopia and 
Djibouti (ICG 2006, 2; Geldenhuys 2009, 141). In 2003 the Somaliland president visited 
Senegal and Djibouti, and in 2006 he embarked on a tour of five AU countries (Zambia, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya) in order to shore up support for Somaliland’s AU 
membership bid (Jhazbhay 2003, 78; Voice of America 2006a). To this should be added that 
Somaliland holds a number of arrangements with aid agencies from Denmark, the UK, and 
US, and its limited connection to international donors also highlights the government’s ability 
to enter into relations on an international scale. 
 
What makes Somaliland’s position so precarious and difficult is that the Montevideo criteria 
can not be applied to Somaliland’s case in the abstract because they are not likely to be the 
only factors taken into consideration when deciding on whether or not to grant explicit 
recognition to the country (ICG 2006, 11). This is because Somaliland is part of a previously 
sovereign and recognised state, the Republic of Somalia. However, Somalia, on the other 
hand, itself does not meet all the Montevideo criteria. It has had no functioning central 
government since 1991, and the current TFG, although recognised internationally, can hardly 
claim to have effective control of even fragments of the country. Also, Somalia’s capacity to 
enter into relations with other states is suspect since the TFG’s real (as opposed to its 
proclaimed) popularity and legitimacy with the population is questionable. As outlined in 
chapter three, state recognition is primarily a political issue, and just because Somaliland 
fulfils or Somalia does not fulfil the Montevideo criteria for statehood, that does not mean that 
states around the world are bound to extend or withdraw international recognition to either 
political entity. States extend international recognition to other states for a host of reasons, 
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and while it can plausibly be argued that Somaliland does indeed meet the Montevideo 
criteria for statehood, this does not in itself guarantee international recognition. 
 
4.5 State secessions, union dissolution, and the sanctity of African borders 
 
In an article examining Somaliland’s right to secession and international recognition Peter 
Roethke argues that should Somaliland not have a valid secessionist right to self-
determination (either because its inhabitants are not considered a “peoples”, the union with 
Italian Somalia was indeed a valid one, or because it cannot claim secession as a remedy to 
the ills and subjugation of the Barre regime), international law may still legitimize its de facto 
secession as a procedural matter (2011, 46). Following arguments of other legal scholars who 
have discussed state secession and how it can be achieved, Roethke states that  
 
Three procedural criteria must be met in order for international law to legitimate 
secession. First, the secession must occur without military aid from foreign 
states. Second, the population of the seceding territory must democratically 
approve of the secession. And third, secession must respect the principle of uti 
possidetis (Ibid.).24 
 
The secession of Somaliland from Somalia indeed fulfils these criteria: the SNM defeated 
Barre’s forces in the north without foreign military intervention but through their own efforts 
and a coalition with other Somali rebel movements, and the subsequent declaration of 
independence received support from Somaliland clans in 1993 and the wider populace in the 
presidential elections of 1997, culminating in the referendum of 2001. The final point in 
Roethke’s discussion refers to the principle of respect for pre-existing borders (in the African 
context, the borders achieved upon independence). Even on this point, Somaliland’s secession 
is in order as the government of Somaliland, in seeking its international recognition, is merely 
exercising its right to control the borders the country received upon independence. 
 
This point of territorial integrity or sanctity of borders received upon independence is crucial 
in Somaliland’s fight for international recognition. The first Pan-African international 
organization, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) enshrined in its founding charter 
provisions against the re-drawing of borders inherited at independence out of concern for 
possible future colonial interference, but mostly to “shore up the stability of newly 
independent, multi-ethnic states whose inherited frontiers routinely divided nations, tribes and 
clans, sowing the seeds of potential secessionist movements across the continent (ICG 2006, 
13).25 This reluctance to meddle in territorial borders of its member states has been passed on 
                                                 
24 From the full term uti possidetis [juris], ita possideatis (“as you possess [in law], so you may possess) (ICG 
2006, 15, note 70). 
25 The African Union is the successor of the Organization of African Unity. 
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to the AU, whose Constitutive Act in Article 4 requires all members to respect “borders 
existing on achievement of independence”. 
 
However, although this sanctity of colonial borders may be the most contentious issue in the 
minds of many AU and African states’ officials when discussing Somaliland’s recognition, it 
provides for a surprisingly simple legal question. As the Somaliland government’s policy 
document on international recognition concludes “the state of Somaliland and its people 
existed as a sovereign international nation until the Act of Union, at which time Somaliland 
sought unification with Southern Somalia” (Somaliland Government 2001, 48). For four full 
days in June 1960 Somaliland was a sovereign and independent state which received 
international recognition from 35 other states including the US (which sent a congratulatory 
message) and the UK (which signed several bilateral agreements with Somaliland) (Shinn 
2002, 6; ICG 2006, 4, note 12). Therefore, when Somaliland seceded from Somalia and 
requested international recognition of its original colonial borders it was respecting Somalia’s 
territorial integrity and borders inherited at independence, and remains in complete 
conformity with Article 4 of the African Union Constitutive Act (ICG 2006, 16).  
 
As far as secessions are concerned, it is difficult to argue that Somaliland poses a dangerous 
precedent for the AU. Since the joining of Somaliland and Somalia was a voluntary union, 
Somaliland’s secession and request for recognition of its internationally recognised pre-union 
borders hardly presents a precedent in itself. There are many cases of voluntary dissolutions 
of unions between sovereign states. In 1989, Senegal opted to terminate its seven year merger 
with Gambia as the Senegambia Federation, and in 1993 Eritrea formally seceded from 
Ethiopia (ICG 2006, 13). To this could be added the cases of Egypt and Syria and their union 
in the United Arab Republic from 1958 to 1961(when Syria seceded); and the brief union 
between Senegal and French Sudan which formed the Mali Federation from 1959 to 1960, 
when it fell apart and both countries received international recognition (Roethke 2011, 44, 
note 54, Eggers 2007, 220). Keeping this in mind, Somaliland’s secession from its union with 
Somalia (or its dissolution of that union) should not be seen as dismembering Somalia, but 
rather as restoring a previously sovereign state to its earlier internationally recognised status 
(Roethke 2011, 44). 
 
However, an important point should be made about the nature of Somaliland’s secession. 
Critics may be inclined to state that the dissolution of the unions mentioned above was done 
through popular referendums or bilateral agreements between states; i.e. there was a 
consultation process between members before one state decided to terminate the union. The 
only problem with this criticism is that, in the case of Somalia, it is unclear who Somaliland 
should approach to discuss a dissolution of the union. Somalia has been poorly positioned to 
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engage in talks regarding either independence or significant autonomy for Somaliland; it has 
lacked any form of government between 1991 and 2000, and was unable to express an 
opinion on Somaliland’s declared withdrawal from the union (ICG 2006, 16). The current 
internationally recognised TFG of Somalia is still struggling to overcome internal divisions 
and establish its authority inside the country (and outside Mogadishu), and depends heavily 
on AMISOM troops and international funding. The fact remains, that “there is no effective 
parent state” from which Somaliland could apply for secession (Clapham et. al. 2011, 9). How 
could the TFG negotiate a dissolution of the union as an equal partner when it does not even 
control the capital of Somalia? And even if it did negotiate, how could anyone know if its 
views were representative of the views of the Somali population they are supposed to 
represent. After all, the TFG is not a democratically elected government of Somalia, but a 
transitional government installed by the international community which is supposed to make 
way for a democratically elected one. Should Somaliland perhaps wait until such elections 
take place and Somalia is better placed to engage in union dissolution talks? As the 
International Crisis Group report on Somaliland concludes “keeping discussion of 
Somaliland’s status in abeyance until the situation in Somalia is fully settled holds Somaliland 
hostage to events over which it has very little control” (2006, 16-17).  
 
4.6 Conclusions  
 
Although it is not often mentioned in scholarly discussions of Somaliland’s secession, a few 
words should be said about Somaliland’s moral right to formal recognition. The idea that 
something is “fair” or “right” is not alien to many cultures around the world. In the context of 
development funding, for example, good, democratic practice or good governance is often 
rewarded with more funding.26 Furthermore, as outlined in chapter three, the EU has adopted 
extensive criteria for state recognition (complementing the Montevideo criteria) which 
include a political structure of democratic governance, respect for minority rights, and the 
upholding of the rule of law. If Somaliland is in general obeyance of these criteria, does this 
not also give it a strong moral right to formal recognition? 
 
Somaliland’s moral right to recognition is based on many aspects. Somaliland, in terms of 
political governance, security and order, and economic activity has the ability to function as a 
sovereign state. One needs to ask how many lives have been saved by the bottom-up locally 
owned process of reconciliation and governance that Somalilanders have developed since 
1991. Somaliland’s democracy is not without its problems, but neither is that of the US. The 
good governance exhibited by authorities in Hargeisa is almost astonishing when contrasted 
                                                 
26 For example, the United States Millennium Challenge Corporation provides funding and aid to countries 
committed to ruling justly, good governance, economic freedom, and investing in people (Millennium Challenge 
Corporation 2012).  
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to Somalia. Somalia has since 1991 wrestled with civil war and grave insecurity, managing to 
form only local polities which are unable to extend their authority past their clan or 
community base.27 The internationally recognised TFG of Somalia has only recently, and 
through heavy support from AMISOM troops, Kenya and Ethiopia, been able to extend its 
authority beyond a few streets in Mogadishu. However, its track record of corruption, internal 
conflict, and mismanagement makes it rather difficult to argue that the much better governed 
Somaliland has not earned a right to be internationally recognised, while the TFG continues to 
receive international recognition. In Somaliland the government enjoys a rather significant 
level of popular support, partially thanks to regular popular elections which have taken place 
since 1997. Elections in Somalia, on the other hand, are yet to materialise. 
 
When stripped of complex international politics and international law provisions, the question 
of Somaliland’s international recognition becomes a simple one. Has this polity, which has 
managed to pacify most of its territory, demobilise the majority of its militias, hold regular 
elections for the past fifteen years, maintain a smooth transition of political power, and 
develop its limited economy and infrastructure without any significant foreign aid not 
displayed strong empirical statehood and perhaps earned a right to be recognised as a 
sovereign state? How can the international community deny Somaliland juridical recognition, 
when the very state of Somalia it does legally recognise has for the past twenty years failed to 
develop any form of trans-local governance and empirical statehood, and its recognised 
government is a product of international tinkering and funding, and not local popular support? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Except for the short lived UIC which was, in 2006, able to extend its authority over most of south and central 
Somalia. 
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5. “To be or not to be”:  
Weighing the possible repercussions of Somaliland’s international 
recognition 
 
In the available literature on Somaliland it is difficult to find any discussion of its 
independence which does not touch upon the questions of whether it would be good or bad to 
formally recognise Somaliland as an independent state, and what consequences this may have 
for other secessionist movements around Africa and the world. In fact, one could argue that 
the potential consequences of Somaliland’s formal recognition, more so than the legal merits 
of its right to statehood, are at the core of Somaliland’s recognition debate. Questions of 
setting a bad example or precedent for the rest of Africa, contributing to the balkanization of 
Somalia and adverse repercussions for the security and political stability of the region, and the 
economic viability of such a small state are amongst the key issues debated by diplomats, 
politicians, and scholars in discussing Somaliland’s formal recognition. Therefore, it is 
imperative that any discussion of the complexities of Somaliland’s international recognition 
encompass and analyze these debates. While there is considerable overlap between some 
arguments against and in favour of Somaliland’s formal recognition (which may cause 
repetition of some ideas), such arguments will be outlined and discussed as they are presented 
in both the “against”, and “in favour” sections of this chapter. 
 
5.1 Arguments against extending Somaliland formal recognition 
 
5.1.1 Sanctity of colonial borders in Africa and the dangerous precedent issue 
 
In his book Contested States in World Politics, Deon Geldenhuys discusses Somaliland’s 
recognition and asks why the international community has so far not recognized its claims to 
statehood. The issues he discusses will form the main focus of this chapter as they offer, in 
addition to other relevant literature, a broad analysis of Somaliland’s recognition situation. 
Perhaps the most pertinent issue influencing Somaliland’s recognition in the context of 
African politics is the “dogmatic commitment to the sanctity of inherited colonial borders and 
hence a deep-seated antipathy to secession”, coupled with an “almost pathological fear of 
setting precedents that would encourage disaffected ethnic minorities to break away from 
existing states” (Geldenhuys 2009, 143). This “precedent” issue is also highlighted by the 
former US ambassador to Ethiopia, David H. Shinn who observes that “presumably, the 
African Union is reluctant to recognize Somaliland for fear that it would increase pressure by 
other groups in Africa to support changes in borders inherited at independence. The fact that 
Somaliland does not fit in the same category seems to be of little importance” (2002, 6). 
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In fact, Somaliland constitutes less of a secession precedent for the AU than for example, 
South Sudan. As noted in the previous chapter, Somaliland completely conforms to Article 4 
of the AU’s charter (respect for borders gained upon independence) and is not seeking to 
occupy Somalia’s territory. Somaliland’s current borders correspond to those of the 
independent Somaliland, and to the British controlled Somaliland from before independence. 
On the other hand, the example of South Sudan is markedly different. South Sudan may have 
seceded from Sudan after a referendum, but this was only achieved after a long and 
devastating civil war. The liberation struggle and Sudan’s civil war have been fought for over 
two decades, and the South’s independence was won by military means, and only after that, 
diplomacy. What South Sudan’s case highlights is that secession can be won after decades 
long insurgency, rebellion, and outright civil war, and that the secession party will be 
rewarded as long as it can “stick to its guns” long enough.  
 
However, what really makes this dangerous precedent argument weak and not applicable in 
Somaliland’s case are the recommendations of the AU’s own Somaliland fact finding mission. 
In 2005 the AU sent a fact finding mission to Somaliland headed by the then deputy 
chairperson of the AU Commission, Patrick Mazimhaka. This mission produced a four page 
unpublished document in which it recommended that  
 
The fact that the “union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified” 
and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes 
Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in 
African political history. Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to 
the notion of “opening a pandora’s box”. As such, the AU should find a special 
method of dealing with this outstanding case. 
 
The mission further added that “the AU should be disposed to judge the case of Somaliland 
from an objective historical viewpoint and a moral angle vis-à-vis the aspirations of the 
people” (African Union 2005). 
 
The argument that recognising Somaliland would somehow make a dangerous precedent in 
African politics should be finally put to rest. Firstly, Somaliland’s situation is rather unique in 
that its history is different from that of many other secession movements. Somaliland, unlike 
South Sudan or Kosovo has actually existed previously as an independent state, and is only 
seeking a return to that status. Secondly, even the AU’s fact finding mission sent to report on 
the situation is Somaliland and its independence aspirations has recommended that the AU not 
use the “Pandora’s box” analogy as an alibi in not dealing with Somaliland.  
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5.1.2 Security problems in the region 
 
The second important reason why Somaliland may not be receiving international recognition 
is because if recognised it may become a destabilizing influence on the region. There are three 
factors for discussion here:  
a) Somaliland’s territorial sovereignty is internally contested and the government does not 
control all of the territory it lays claim to (especially in the east towards Puntland); 
b) the two Somali states could be fierce rivals thereby jeopardizing regional peace and 
stability, and a consolidated Somalia could in the future try and lay claim to Somaliland with 
forcible means (Geldenhuys 2009, 143);  
c) recognition of Somaliland’s independence could antagonize Al-Shabaab, which is 
committed to Somali unity, and could view Somaliland’s recognition as outside meddling in 
Somali affairs (Clapham et. al., 2011, 10). 
 
As far as Somaliland’s territorial sovereignty is concerned, it is internally contested, and there 
are problems with Puntland in the Sool, Sanaag, and Ceyn regions in the east of Somaliland.28 
However, as Herbst observes, there are few African states which exercise effective control 
over their territory (quoted in Bradbury 2008, 249). Or, in the words of Jackson and Rosberg 
(1982), there are many African states which are empirically weak, yet are still extended 
juridical statehood. The situation in regards to Somaliland’s eastern regions is complex and 
the dynamics of local politics are difficult to guess at. It is possible that recognising 
Somaliland can contribute to a worsening border security situation between Somaliland and 
Puntland, but it is also possible that Somaliland’s recognition will give it greater resources, 
authority and international credibility in policing its borders and managing border disputes 
with its neighbours. 
 
That Somalia and Somaliland could become fierce rivals in the future, and thereby threaten 
regional peace and stability is based on several premises; namely that Somalia will unite itself 
sometime soon and put an end to its political anarchy, that this united Somalia will be on bad 
terms with Somaliland, and finally that this united Somalia will indeed seek to forcibly annex 
Somaliland. Firstly, how long it will take Somalia to develop a system of governance with 
centralized or federal national political authority is anyone’s guess. Even if such a system of 
governance does come about, will it not (following over 20 years of destruction and conflict) 
perhaps be more concerned with rebuilding, reconciliation, and social questions rather than 
another round of fighting? It is possible that politicians in a new unified Somalia could use 
                                                 
28 Relations between Somaliland and Puntland remain strained over these disputed territories and were not 
helped by the January 2012 announcement of Dhulbahante clan leaders and politicians from Sool, Sanaag and 
Ceyn  that they were forming a new administration, called the “Khaatumo State” (United Nations 2012, 5, para. 
22). 
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Somaliland’s independent status as an example of foreign interference (balkanizing Somalia) 
and attempt a war in order to “unify” these two Somali territories, but such an act would very 
probably risk international condemnation and sanctions. While it is known that the 
Somaliland question is highly contentious in Somalia,29 attitudes do change and it is possible 
that the future newly unified Somalia will accept Somaliland as a sovereign neighbour rather 
than seek fighting or annexing it. 
  
The third point is indeed a troubling one, especially as Al-Shabaab is a terrorist organisation 
which could wreck considerable havoc on Somaliland, as it has in the recent past in Uganda 
and Kenya. Indeed this much has been acknowledged by Somaliland’s Foreign Minister 
Abdullahi Duale in a 2010 meeting with US Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson, where Duale 
confirmed that Al-Shabaab and related extremists “remain a “real threat” to Somaliland, 
which they [the Somaliland government] do not take lightly” (United States 2010, point 8). 
However, recent AMISOM, Kenyan and Ethiopian military operations in Somalia could have 
the potential of diminishing the ability of Al-Shabaab to control large swaths of Somali 
territory and receive funding and arms. Also, wouldn’t Al-Shabaab’s potential threat be a 
stronger argument in favour of recognising Somaliland, rather than against it? If recognised, 
and with due foreign aid and development investment Somaliland could bolster its internal 
security, establish better border controls, and police its territory sufficiently to prevent large 
scale terrorist acts. International recognition would allow the government of Somaliland to 
enter various intelligence sharing schemes and enhance its capabilities of fighting terrorist 
threats in the country. While the threat of antagonizing Al-Shabaab is a serious one, it can 
hardly be argued that the right of a people for self-determination should be held hostage by 
the potential antagonization of a terrorist organisation.  
 
5.1.3 Questionable popular support for Somaliland’s independence 
 
A third reason often invoked for withholding Somaliland’s international recognition is the 
questionable domestic popular support for independence (Geldenhuys 2009, 143). 
Somaliland, or the north of Somalia, was liberated from Barre’s brutal rule by the SNM. The 
SNM was founded by Issaq expatriates and remained essentially an Issaq organisation 
(Bradbury 2008, 66). When the SNM handed power over to the Somaliland transitional 
government, it too was dominated mostly by Issaq clan members. This is important because 
the Issaq were especially targeted by Barre and his repressive regime, and suffered 
extensively. As a result it is understandable that it is the Issaq of all the Somaliland clans who 
                                                 
29 In November 2005 Somalia's Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Geedi stated in an interview with the BBC that his 
government would not object to Somaliland’s international recognition, and also stated in a subsequent interview 
that his administration would engage Somaliland in dialogue. Geedi was almost immediately roundly 
condemned for a treasonable offence (ICG 2006, 19; Djibnews 2005; Samatar 2005).   
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are the least willing to re-unite with Somalia, and the loudest advocates for independence. 
However, the other, minority, clans in Somaliland may not be as enthusiastic about 
Somaliland’s independence as the Issaq. As Bradbury argues, “among many Gadabursi, Harti 
and ‘Iise, attachment to Somaliland is much weaker. Indeed, many non-Issaq view it as an 
Issaq ‘project’ from which they feel politically and economically excluded” (2008, 251). 
 
In the 2001 referendum on independence two thirds of Somaliland’s eligible voters cast their 
votes, and with a ninety seven percent majority voted in favour of independence (Shinn 2002, 
2). However, in the regions with the greatest opposition to the referendum, such as the Las 
Anod district of Sool region, voter turnout was only thirty one percent (Ibid.). The low turnout 
should not necessarily be a worrying issue in itself; what it demonstrates is that in a 
democracy people are allowed to express their opinions or withhold their support for certain 
policies. A major hallmark of democracy is a the freedom of a division of opinions, and 
elections in stronger democracies than Somaliland’s are also marked by great divergences of 
opinions; one simply needs to look at Ireland or France’s referendums on joining certain 
European Union policies to understand this. 
 
In fact, what is arguably more worrying than voter support for the independence referendum 
in Somaliland is an oppressive culture towards public discussions of possible union with 
Somalia. At the internationally sponsored conference on Somalia in Djibouti in 2000, 
Somaliland “not only refused to participate in the conference, but its Parliament passed a law 
that prohibited representatives of the government or private citizens to attend, declaring 
attendance a treasonable offense” (Shinn 2002, 2). In fact this ban on participation in 
international conferences on Somalia was only overturned on February 5 this year, in order to 
allow Somaliland to participate in the UK hosted London Conference on Somalia (United 
Nations 2012, 5, para. 23). Among many Issaq Somaliland’s independence is sacrosanct, and 
the right to debate the independence publicly in the country is actually prevented by 
emergency laws (Bradbury 2008, 251). Leaders who might be willing to discuss such issues 
risk the wrath of the electorate and possible treason charges (ICG 2006, 19). Such stifling 
laws and public attitudes are not compatible with democracy and this is a real danger for free 
speech and democratic development in Somaliland. 
 
The issue of questionable popular support for independence among Somaliland’s minority 
clans, however troubling its implications may be for domestic political developments and 
governance, need not negatively influence Somaliland’s international recognition. Every 
democratic country has minorities and they need not always see eye to eye with the majority. 
But if the majority of Somaliland’s population, be they Issaq or not, are in favour of 
independence, in democracy majority rules, and as such their opinions should matter. 
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5.1.4 Undermining the AU and TFG’s efforts in Somalia, and the questionable economic 
viability of Somaliland 
 
There are two more often cited reasons why international recognition for Somaliland is 
lacking: that such recognition undermines the efforts of the AU and TFG in rebuilding 
Somalia, and that  it is questionable how economically viable Somaliland as an independent 
state is (Geldenhuys 2009, 143; Clapham et. al., 2011, 10). It can be argued that to undermine 
the efforts of the AU and TFG in rebuilding Somalia is not a difficult feat. Al-Shabaab has 
been doing so for years now, and the TFG and its predecessor the TNG have done it 
themselves countless times. While Al-Shabaab has been undermining these rebuilding efforts 
through gaining actual popular support, conducting terrorist activity, or outright military 
conflict, the TFG and TNG have done it through corruption, mismanagement, and a 
distinctive lack of popular support in the country. Somaliland’s role here has so far been non-
existent. 
 
It is very difficult to argue that the international recognition of a popular, legitimate and 
democratically elected government of Somaliland with its ability to foster an environment 
conducive of reconciliation, peace, and economic activity, can be an impediment to the state-
building efforts of the undemocratically elected and internationally installed transitional 
government of Somalia. With over sixteen internationally funded conferences on Somalia and 
over twenty years of trying to bring about any kind of political unity and reconciliation, not to 
mention the countless millions of dollars in aid and development funding, Somalia has had its 
fare share of opportunities to rebuild itself (Walls 2009, 372). Somaliland’s international 
recognition can not change that record. 
 
Economic viability is always an issue with state secession, especially with small states. 
Somaliland is poor, underdeveloped and one of the most resource scarce countries in the 
world, and as such may constitute another “economic basket-case” forever dependant on 
foreign aid (Geldenhuys 2009, 143). However, while Somaliland is not an economic basket-
case dependant on foreign aid, even if it were, would that prohibit it from gaining 
recognition? Looking at it from this perspective, one could argue that many African or Asian 
states should never have been granted independence or recognition. There are several 
independent and sovereign African states which rely to a great extent on foreign aid to fill 
their budgets, and this can hardly be invoked as a criterion for state recognition. For example, 
Uganda’s budget in 2006 was half made up of foreign aid and who knows how much aid the 
country has actually received since independence (Mwenda 2006, 2). 
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On the other hand, with some ninety eight percent of the budget coming from oil revenues 
South Sudan’s dependence on a single commodity is notorious, and with only 60 kilometres 
of paved roads, does it not also constitute a poor and underdeveloped state, an “economic 
basket-case” which for the foreseeable future will to a large extent depend on foreign aid for 
its survival (CIA Factbook 2012). As Spears has observed, “is a community which has been 
oppressed by its own government and which might be judged economically unviable less 
worthy of statehood than a similarly oppressed group which has a thriving industrial base” 
(Spears 2003, 91)?  
 
Somaliland has, not withstanding immense difficulties, managed to survive for over twenty 
years now. Its record of self-reliance over this period suggests that the view of its economic 
unviability is exaggerated. There is no doubt that Somaliland’s budget is limited and not 
adequate to meet the developmental challenges the county faces or will face in the future, but 
with very small and limited levels of foreign aid a basic system of public administration has 
been formed in the country, security has been established, private and public infrastructure is 
being rebuilt, and thousands of returnees have been absorbed into society (Bradbury 2008, 
253). In fact, while still poor, Somaliland’s performance compares favourably with that of 
many wealthier neighbours. 
 
Economic viability is not the only, or main, presiding issue for international recognition of a 
state. As Adam argues, “few states in Africa are economically 'viable' in the strict sense of the 
term. Political rather than economic viability criteria were used to recognise most of the states 
that seceded since 1989” (Adam 1994, 37). It is political viability, namely the ability for local 
and national political governance, and the ability to provide basic public goods that are also 
important in determining the statehood viability of an aspiring political entity. Economic 
viability, although very important, should not be invoked as an argument against Somaliland’s 
recognition, especially because Somaliland has managed to survive to date largely through 
self-funding and remittances, and without any significant injections of foreign aid. 
 
5.2 Arguments in favour of extending Somaliland formal recognition 
 
5.2.1 Rewarding Somaliland for its efforts in state-building 
 
One argument which favours Somaliland’s international recognition is that if such recognition 
is extended it will satisfy Somaliland’s national pride and reward its efforts in state-building 
and democratisation (Clapham et. al. 2011, 11). Somaliland has come a long way in the past 
twenty years, and its achievement in nation building and governance are impressive. As one 
observer concluded “since withdrawing from the union, the Republic of Somaliland has 
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emerged as the most stable polity within the territory of the Somali Republic and since 1997 it 
has been one of the most stable areas in the Horn of Africa” (Bradbury 2008, 245). This is no 
small achievement considering Somaliland borders one of the most dangerous places in the 
world, the archetypical synonym for a “failed state”. 
 
In fact Somaliland’s success in state building and governance can best be understood when 
contrasted with Somalia’s failures. This is another reason why recognizing Somaliland may 
even be good for Somalia. As the argument goes, Somaliland’s recognition could have 
positive consequences for the south because it would change the incentive structures for 
Mogadishu (which receives lavish international attention and some $ 750 million annually in 
aid) and force it to pull its act together (Clapham et. al. 2011, 11). While it is questionable 
whether Somaliland’s recognition would be an incentive for Somalia, it is plausible that 
Somalia’s elites could receive less support from international donors, which could in turn 
influence the peace making and state building dynamics in the south. 
 
5.2.2 Recognition would strengthen regional security 
 
Another argument cited in favour of extending Somaliland international recognition is that it 
would strengthen the state and bolster regional security (Clapham et. al. 2011, 11). As already 
noted, international recognition could significantly improve Somaliland’s abilities and 
capacities in border control, anti-piracy activities, and fighting crime and terrorism. Currently 
“non-recognition means that Somaliland to a large extent stands outside the mechanisms 
established by the international system for regulating the flows of people, money and goods 
across national frontiers” (Ibid., 18). This has the potential to really hurt Somalilanders as 
they miss out on possible revenues from cross-border trade, and only “enjoy” the negative 
cross-border transactions such as smuggling, crime, and terrorism. 
 
The terrorism issue is very sensitive for Somalilanders as they recognise the potential in the 
young population for radicalization. In a 2011 interview, the vice-president for academic 
affairs at the University of Hargeisa, Abdirahman Ahmed Hussei observed an increasing trend 
of Islamization among students, partly because “people have become more observant, which 
is a consequence of the war and the extent today of political, economic, and social insecurity. 
Religion becomes a refuge in this environment” (quoted in Clapham et. al. 2011, 21). 
International recognition could bolster development in Somaliland, which would have a 
beneficial effect on youth employment and social status, thereby influencing world-views and 
diminishing the prospects of religious radicalization.  
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On the other hand, there is also a potential for outside deliberate destabilization activities, as 
radical elements from Somalia attempt to terrorise the newly recognised government is 
Somaliland. Although this could be triggered by international recognition, there is evidence 
that Somaliland’s democratic governance and respect for female rights and empowerment are 
already under attack by radical religious elements from Somalia (ICG 2006, 20; Somaliland 
Press 2011). This is why recognising Somaliland would greatly aid the government in 
maintaining security, but also provide the region with a first constitutional Muslim 
democracy; according to US military officers, a proven partner in the war on terror (Ibid., 21). 
As one ambassador of an African state argued in 2006 “given the imperative of the regional 
counter-terrorism strategy, I cannot see how Somaliland would be overlooked” (quoted in 
ICG 2006, 21). 
 
5.2.3 No return to union with Somalia for the majority of Somaliland’s population 
 
A third argument for Somaliland’s international recognition is that there is “no realistic way 
of persuading them [Somaliland] to rejoin Somalia short of launching a war (Clapham et. al. 
2011, 12). Considering that the majority of Somaliland’s population was born after 1991 and 
Somaliland’s declaration of independence, and that they do not have any memory or identity 
as citizens of a unified Somalia, it is difficult to imagine an incentive for them to join a union 
with the south. Add to this the still very grave material and security conditions in the rest of 
Somalia, and it is understandable why Somalilanders may not be interested in re-joining 
Somalia.  
 
Unfortunately, it has been over twenty years since northerners and especially Issaq were able 
to freely own property, hold political office, and conduct business in the Somalia. A 
legitimate reason why most Issaq do not wish to rejoin the union with Somalia is because “the 
opportunities for people in Somaliland to regain a financial and political foothold in the south 
are slim” (Bradbury 2008, 252). As Bradbury concludes 
 
Northerners have not only lost physical assets in the south from looting, but also 
rights to social protection, economic rights and rights of access and ownership. 
In a reconstituted Somalia, with Mogadishu as its capital, Isaaqs and others who 
have fled or were chased out of the south are likely to feel more marginalised 
than they were before the war (Ibid.). 
 
Moreover, the political elites of Somaliland are firmly against reverting back to any unity with 
Somalia; a fact highlighted by several confidential US embassy cables. For example, in 2004 
US embassy officials met with a prominent London based Somalilander who was a “premier 
advocate for recognition”. This person, Dr. Omar Duhod, in discussing the Somali Peace 
Talks in Nairobi stated that “if Somaliland is forced to go back to Somalia, there would be 
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civil war”, and added that the Somali’s negotiating in Nairobi “are those that committed 
atrocities” (United States 2004a, point 4). Similar arguments were raised six months later in a 
meeting between Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Edna Ismail Aden and US Ambassador 
Ragsdale. When the US Ambassador asked Foreign Minister Aden if there was a way 
Somaliland could work with Abdillahi Yusuf, then president of the TFG, Foreign Minister 
Aden replied that this was not possible because Yusuf was an individual who had committed 
atrocities against Somaliland, and “will never have the support of Somaliland’s people” 
(United States 2004b, point 4). In 2007, at a meeting between US embassy officials and 
Somaliland citizens discussing Somaliland developments and recognition, US officials were 
told that “Somalilanders will never go back to Somalia after what happened to them under 
Siyad Barre”, and that they would rather die fighting than become part of Somalia: “with or 
without recognition, they will never agree to go back to Somalia” (United States 2007b, point 
3). During a subsequent meeting with Djibouti’s Minister of Communication the embassy 
official was told that while Somalilanders wish their southern neighbour well, “there is no 
going back, ever” (Ibid., point 5).  
 
In fact, it appears that these views have not changed and Somaliland’s leadership is still 
adamant that the territory will not re-join Somalia. As recently as May 2012 Somaliland’s 
Foreign Minister Mohamed A. Omar stated in front of an audience of UK members of 
parliament and diplomats that “while we will never allow Somaliland to return to unity with 
Somalia, we wish our neighbor well, and stand ready to offer her advice and discuss matters 
of mutual bilateral interest on a basis of mutual respect and from our vantage point as a 
sovereign, separate entity” (Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation 2012). 
 
5.2.4 International recognition would allow for more aid and foreign investment 
 
Somaliland’s economy and development would be greatly aided by foreign investment and 
aid, which is currently not forthcoming in sufficient amounts. This is another strong argument 
for international recognition. Foreign investment and aid have the capacity to strengthen the 
governance structures in the country and allow Somalilanders to rebuild much needed 
infrastructure and engage in international trade. International recognition would also allow the 
government to enter trade agreements and engage in international financial markets, which 
could further bolster government funding. However, an issue to be mindful of is that one of 
the reasons why Somaliland has achieved so much, especially in contrast to Somalia, is 
because its institutions and businesses have been home-grown and locally funded. Too much 
aid coupled with poor administration of the aid sector and government spending could have a 
negative effect on the country (as seen from Somalia’s case) as they could negatively 
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influence government accountability and local ownership of governance. Unfortunately this is 
a trap for any developing country and can only be mitigated by professional and personal 
integrity of Somaliland’s leaders, accountable and transparent practices, and governance 
which is in tune with the needs of the people. 
 
5.2.5 Without recognition Somaliland might worsen 
 
Connected to this question of development and foreign funding is the argument that if 
Somaliland does not receive due international recognition, the economic situation in the 
country might deteriorate. Youth unemployment in Somaliland is already a serious problem. 
One Somaliland politician noted that between sixty and seventy percent of an increasingly 
globalised, youthful population is unemployed, with more than half of the youth without 
opportunities to go further in their studies or find a job; a situation he characterises as “a time-
bomb” (quoted in Clapham et. al. 2011, 13). This is where the potential for religious 
radicalization and crime comes in. If Somaliland’s youths do not see a chance for prosperity 
by legitimate means, they might resolve to activities that endanger their communities, the 
state, and by extension, the region. However, local government officials and politicians 
should not be the only ones worried about youth unemployment in Somaliland. As one 
prominent businessman stated “a lack of jobs goes hand in hand with a lack of hope, which 
creates terrorism and gets us back to square one. The West cannot worry about terrorism and 
then not recognise Somaliland” (quoted in Clapham et. al. 2011, 24).  
 
5.3 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has outlined and analyzed some of the most cited arguments against and in 
favour of Somaliland’s international recognition. In addition to legal arguments (discussed in 
the previous chapter) which form the basis of any discussion of state sovereignty and 
secession, it is also important to take into consideration economic, societal, and political 
issues. What seems to be the central issue with regards to Somaliland’s formal recognition is 
not necessarily the legal validity of its secession, but the possible repercussions of formally 
recognising its statehood. 
 
The primary argument against Somaliland’s recognition, namely the sanctity of colonial 
borders and how Somaliland’s recognition could pose a dangerous precedent for the AU, is 
actually invalid. Somaliland’s borders are not in violation of Somalia’s sovereign territory, 
and are in conformity with Article 4 of the African Union’s charter. Somaliland’s situation is 
far more complex than that of a regional liberation struggle attempting to secede from a state 
which has mistreated its population, and this is attested by the African Union fact finding 
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mission’s recommendations which urge the Union to treat Somaliland’s secession as “unique 
and self-justified in African political history” (African Union 2005). 
 
Amongst other issues the chapter has argued that extending Somaliland international 
recognition could serve to bolster, rather than diminish, its capacity to police its borders, fight 
piracy, maintain regional security, and act as a partner in the war on terror. As for the question 
of Somaliland’s economic viability as an independent state, the chapter has argued that one 
need only look at other African states in the neighbourhood, or other secessionist states 
around the world to see that economic viability is hardly a presiding issue when debating state 
recognition. Somaliland has over the past twenty years achieved considerable things with a 
very small budget, and considering how much money has been wasted on Somalia’s 
governance and peace building exercises, Somaliland stands out as an exemplary cost-
effective actor with abilities to fund itself and even maintain certain levels of governance 
regardless of its poverty and economic hardship. 
 
Once accepted as a peer amongst the club of nations, Somaliland will be able to access 
international funding and greater levels of development aid which have the potential to foster 
greater development and economic activity, thereby contributing to the stabilisation of its 
troubled neighbourhood. Although aid and investment alone cannot guarantee greater 
development and prosperity, coupled with a locally owned and accountable style of 
governance and administration, they can allow Somalilanders a better future. Perhaps most 
importantly, international recognition can aid Somaliland in providing hope and employment 
opportunities for its youthful population; a population which can be a driver of both positive 
and negative developments depending on their options for a dignified existence.  
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6. Players and their roles in Somaliland’s international 
recognition game 
 
It is impossible to say whether the people who declared Somaliland’s independence in 1991 
had any idea about how long or complex their struggle for international recognition would be. 
One could argue that Somaliland has been largely unsuccessful in seeking international 
recognition if compared to, for example, other secession movements such as that of Kosovo. 
However, although the road to international recognition is a long and difficult one, 
Somaliland has so far managed to tread it with marked success, considering its rather 
marginal importance in international politics. It should be remembered that Somalia has only 
been resurrected as an international security issue in the past six years; most notably because 
of Al-Shabaab’s reported international terrorist connections (which have only materialised 
quite recently), and the piracy problems off the north and east coasts of Somalia. In fact, 
international interest in Somalia has in the past fifteen years been rather limited and included 
mostly humanitarian interventions battling famine. As a result of such famines largely 
bypassing the north of Somalia, in this time period, Somaliland has to a great extent remained 
below the international community’s radar. 
 
Nevertheless, in order to understand Somaliland’s inability to secure international recognition, 
it is important to examine the country’s relationship with segments of the international 
community. This chapter therefore discusses global, continental, and regional players in 
Somaliland’s recognition game, and seeks to analyze their positions on the country’s 
independence. In the context of this discussion the “international community” does not 
include African states, but some developed countries which have a history of involvement in 
Somali affairs. Also, as the main political international organisation which admits states into 
the “international club of nations” the position of the UN towards Somaliland will be 
analyzed as well. Turning towards a greater continental focus, the chapter will discuss AU 
“heavyweights” such as Egypt and South Africa, both of whom have a pronounced interest in, 
or close association with Somaliland and Somali issues. Following this, the chapter focuses 
on Somaliland’s immediate neighbourhood and analyzes Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, and 
their relationships with the territory. Finally, the discussion culminates with an analysis of the 
AU’s position towards Somaliland and why its recognition of the country is still lacking.  
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6.1 The West30 
 
The attitudes of Western donors towards Somalia are somewhat puzzling; they combine a 
general lack of interest, their own geo-political strategic interests, fears of “colonialist” labels 
and perceptions, and an almost religious dedication to outdated and failed practices of 
supporting numerous international conferences aimed at centralised state-building. Such an 
approach has to a certain extent prolonged Somaliland’s recognition problems but also 
Somalia’s difficult political situation.  
 
The UK, for example, as the previous colonial administrator of Somaliland is perhaps the 
country’s most sympathetic non-African international partner. Somaliland has an embassy in 
London, and the UK has a track record of donor presence in Somaliland. UK foreign officials 
have stated that “Our policy is to do whatever we can to help, short of recognition” (quoted in 
ICG 2006, 13). In fact, US Embassy confidential cables state that after a visit to Somaliland in 
2008, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State Kim Howells questioned  his 
government’s non-recognition policy towards the country, and wrote to then Foreign 
Secretary David Miliband “speaking in glowing terms about the “brilliant progress” that has 
been made in Somaliland, questioning HMG’s [Her Majesty’s Government’s] policy of non-
recognition, and advocating for more support” (United States 2008, point 2).  
 
However, it is difficult to reconcile this attitude of trying to aid Somaliland, with the UK’s 
advertised support for the Somali centralised state project, exhibited by the recent London 
Conference on Somalia. The five hour conference’s focus was entirely on Somalia, and its 
declared aim on the political front was to “agree on a way of helping the Somali transitional 
government to ensure that whatever political arrangement succeeds the transition is 
representative and legitimate” (United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2012). 
The UK displayed nominal support for the TFG in London and this policy is in accordance 
with the assessment of US embassy analysts who argued back in 2008 that “there is no 
evidence to indicate that HMG will recognize Somaliland as an independent nation, especially 
with HMG officials focused on promoting foreign policy that will help stabilize south 
Somalia and support the Djibouti Agreement” (United States 2008, point 4). 
 
The President of Somaliland did attend the recent London conference which no doubt gave 
him and his country important access to international political heavyweights. This much has 
been acknowledged recently by Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Mohamed Omar who stated 
                                                 
30 The term “the West” is a difficult one and I use it hesitantly with due recognition of the problematic 
connotations of defining what or who “the West” is. While referring to “the West” I am primarily referring to 
countries which have a history of involvement and interest in Somaliland and I have been able to find some 
information on their positions towards Somaliland’s status (namely the US, UK, Denmark, Sweden). 
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that his country was “treated as an equal partner on par with other African states at the 
London Conference” and that his president “had meetings with several European leaders in 
the margins of the event” (Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation 2012). However, Somaliland is mentioned only twice in the final conference 
communiqué; once in regards to piracy and the transfer of prisoners to internationally built 
Somaliland jails (point 16), and once in regards to the political situation in the country. Point 
6 of the communiqué states: “The Conference recognized the need for the international 
community to support any dialogue that Somaliland and the TFG or its replacement may 
agree to establish in order to clarify their future relations”. As one observer has noted, this 
does very little to clarify the current relationship between the leaders of the TFG and 
Somaliland: “Are they leaders of a central government and a regional one, as TFG leaders 
entertain, or leaders of two neighboring countries, as the Somalilanders assert” (Liban 2012). 
Officially, the conference was not a venue for discussing Somaliland’s recognition bid, but as 
Somaliland’s Foreign Minister noted did offer Somaliland diplomats some behind the scenes 
time to foster diplomatic ties and possibly discuss investment and aid. While this could be 
seen as the UK doing whatever it could to help, it can also be seen as a missed opportunity to 
table a different agenda and perhaps shift the focus from ineffective attempts at internationally 
sponsored state-building in Somalia, to supporting domestic state formation processes that 
have been relatively successful in Somaliland. 
 
Western donors generally keep their hands off the Somaliland question, and favour an African 
solution to Somaliland’s international status. What this generally means is that they will not 
interfere (at least openly) in Somaliland’s status until Somalis, and then the AU decide on a 
course of action (ICG 2006, 13; European Commission 2008, 11). However, some countries 
may be more willing to adhere to this principle, while others are not. Denmark, for example, 
does not extend formal recognition to Somaliland, but in its new engagement policy with 
Somalia devotes a considerable focus to supporting and funding projects in Somaliland 
(Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, 1,15,18). Naturally while this does not do much 
for Somaliland’s recognition aspirations, it arguably does show recognition of the country as 
an important and stable regional political entity. This has been further highlighted by the fact 
that several European countries, including the UK, Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden “have 
denied asylum to Somalilanders and repatriated them on the grounds that their homeland is 
safe and secure” (ICG 2006, 12). Additionally, Sweden has made a beneficially pragmatic 
step by recognising Somaliland as a “self-governing” area for aid purposes (Somaliland 
Times 2007a). This means that Somaliland will be receiving its own allocated aid from 
Sweden, as opposed to receiving it from a joint Somalia budget. 
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However, not all western countries adhere to the proclaimed non-interference principle well.  
The US has cultivated a somewhat contradictory relationship with Somaliland. US 
confidential embassy cables reveal that in 2004 Somaliland’s Foreign Minister, Edna Ismail 
Aden, sought “interim status” recognition from the US, initially discussed during the last days 
of the Clinton Administration (United States 2004b, point 1). Although the US has to date 
provided no form of an “interim status” sought by Somaliland, it has in the past used its 
influence to intervene in Somaliland and Somali affairs. In regards to Somaliland, confidential 
embassy cables state that in 2007 the US government asked Somaliland to release a convicted 
terrorist. While it is unclear from the cable if this person was released into US custody, what 
is clear is that, according to then Somaliland Foreign Minister, Abdillahi M. Duale, 
Somaliland complied with the US request “despite the detainee’s recent conviction “among 
other terrorists,” and some parliamentarians’ opposition to his release” (United States 2007a, 
point 5). For a country that did not officially recognise, nor grant “interim status” of 
recognition to Somaliland, the US has exhibited considerable influence and interest in 
Somaliland’s internal affairs. To this should be added that the US also requested, and 
Somaliland accepted, the transferral of three of its Guantanamo detainees, one in 2008, and 
two in 2009 (United States 2009b, 2009c). 
 
On the other hand, the US has also in recent years intervened directly more than once in 
Somali affairs. When the 2006 rise of the UIC in south and central Somalia for the first time 
brought a certain amount of peace and political authority to the country, fears of its terrorist 
links fuelled by TFG officials’ and Ethiopia’s scaremongering secured US support for a 
subsequent Ethiopian invasion of the country (Lewis 2008, 88). As Bradbury concludes “Of 
course, Western governments’ line that ‘Somalia’s solutions lie with Somalis’ appears 
somewhat disingenuous in the light of the support given to the TFG to overrun the Islamic 
Courts in 2006” (2008, 256).  
 
While it would seem that the West is indeed committed to a “Somali” or “African” solution to 
the Somaliland question, the situation is rather more complex. Some western donors support 
Somaliland’s stabilising role in the region, while keeping away from any discussions of its 
international recognition. Others, while maintaining the rhetoric of aiding the Somali people, 
have no apprehensions about intervening politically or militarily whenever their interests 
dictate such intervention, with very little regard for political dynamics in the country. In terms 
of why Western countries are still not recognising Somaliland, officially this is because they 
do not wish to interfere in African affairs, but judging from their behaviour more probably 
because they can satisfy their strategic interests without the need to extend formal recognition. 
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6.2 The United Nations 
 
As Iqbal Jhazbhay argues “Although the UN has long been engaged in Somaliland, principally 
through agencies like the UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF, there is unlikely to be any progress 
in the country’s relations with the UN until there is an ‘African solution’ to the question of its 
status” (2007, 298). In 2000, the president of Somaliland Mohamed Ibrahim Egal called upon 
the UN to grant Somaliland special interim status, similar to that enjoyed by Kosovars and 
Palestinians (BBC 2000). Such status would allow Somaliland to deal with donors and 
international financial institutions, and possibly gain access to more aid and international 
funding. Unfortunately, this recognition of Somaliland is still not forthcoming, and the UN 
appears more than comfortable with leaving Somaliland’s status to be dealt with squarely by 
the AU.  
 
Somaliland’s relations with various UN departments, especially the United Nations Political 
Office for Somalia (UNPOS) have been strained at best, and outright hostile and conflicting at 
worst. As the Somaliland government policy paper on international recognition states, 
relations between the country and the UN have “borne the marks of polite, sometimes 
anguished, enmity” over their respective differences in opinion on Somaliland’s independence 
(Somaliland Government 2001, 7). The document further argues that UNPOS treated 
Somaliland as an outsider in terms of awarding development projects and funding as long as it 
insisted on political separation from Somalia, and even saw it as an obstacle to peace building, 
making it an object of public abuse (Ibid., 10-11). However, the way the UN has gone about 
some of its business in the past has not only been objectionable to Somaliland. Somali 
commentators and academics have questioned the UN’s track record in their country and there 
is a plethora of opinion pieces and articles discussing the UN’s policies in Somalia. One need 
only consult the writings of the scholar Abdi Samatar (a vocal proponent of a unified 
Somalia) to receive an account of how several UN agencies (including UNPOS) have 
undermined Somali efforts at state-building with dire consequences for the Somali people 
(Samatar 2012). 
 
6.3 Egypt  
 
Egypt’s relationship with, and in interest in, Somalia can only be understood vis-à-vis its 
relationship with Ethiopia. As Jhazbhay states “Egypt has a long historical interest in Somalia 
and has in the past used Somalia as a pawn to distract Ethiopia” (2007, 246). Egypt’s main 
concern is the Nile River which constitutes the lifeline of the country. With some eighty six 
percent of the water reaching the Aswan Dam emanating from Ethiopia, the Egyptian 
leadership wants to maintain “maximum leverage over Ethiopia” (Shinn 2002, 4-5). Egypt 
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supported Somalia in its 1977 war with Ethiopia, but also in the mid 1960s, when President 
Nasser sent rifles to the Somalis with the Arabic inscription “Mautul Habash, Wa Hayat al-
Somal”, meaning “death to Ethiopia and long live Somalia” (Jhazbhay 2007, 247). 
 
Egypt is a staunch supporter of Somali unity and the TFG; a policy in line with its desires for 
a strong and unified Somalia which may even one day re-assert its claims over Somali 
populated areas of Ethiopia, thereby adding to Egypt’s leverage (Shinn 2002, 5). Moreover 
Egypt’s enthusiastic support for the interim rulers in Mogadishu has “been matched by its 
hostility towards Somaliland” (Geldenhuys 2009, 142). Egypt has supported the 2000 Arta 
process which gave birth to Mogadishu’s transitional political entities and strongly opposes an 
independent Somaliland (Shinn 2002, 5). An Egyptian envoy visited Somaliland in October 
2002 and urged the government to participate in the Kenya sponsored talks on Somali unity. 
However, such proposals were turned down by Somaliland’s president who reminded the 
Egyptian envoy that his country was one of the first states to recognize Somaliland’ 
independence back in 1960 (Ibid.). 
 
Egypt’s opposition to Somaliland’s independence dates back to the early 1990s, and the days 
of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. John Drysdale recounted in a 2004 
workshop in Hargeisa how Boutros-Ghali tried everything in his power to prevent and reverse 
Somaliland’s declaration of independence, even going to the extent of making a bid via the 
UN to have Egyptian troops deployed in Berbera as part of a “peacekeeping” presence that 
would have given Egypt a major strategic military foothold in the Horn of Africa (quoted in 
Jhazbhay 2007, 279). This was part of an attempt to have a UN resolution passed which, 
according to Drysdale, would have declared the “territorial integrity” of Somalia, inclusive of 
Somaliland. Egyptian troops would have given force to such a resolution, had it materialised 
(Ibid.). 
 
As if to add to the complexities of Somaliland’s precarious international position, Egypt’s 
concerns about Somalia have to a large extent expanded into wider Arab League interests in 
the region (Jhazbhay 2007, 276). The Arab League, of which Somalia is a member, has been a 
strong supporter of the TFG and Somali unity, and opposes Somaliland’s independence 
(Ibid.). This situation is complex because Gulf States pose a large dilemma for Somaliland. 
Traditionally Saudi Arabia has been a large importer of Somaliland livestock, but has for the 
better part of the past fifteen years banned Somaliland livestock imports on the basis of Rift 
Valley Fever infection (Shinn 2002, 4). While Somaliland does not view the Arab League 
favourably, mostly due to its support for the TFG, it still needs to plot a non-confrontation 
course due to its dependency on Saudi demand for the country’s livestock. 
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6.4 South Africa 
 
Of the African states not neighbouring Somaliland, South Africa has emerged as the main 
state “willing to entertain Somaliland’s case for international recognition” (Jhazbhay 2007, 
284). This view is motivated by several reasons. In April 2003 the Office of the Chief State 
Law Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa authored a legal brief on 
“Somaliland’s Claim to Sovereign Status”. The brief found that “it is undeniable that 
Somaliland does indeed qualify for statehood, and it is incumbent upon the international 
community to recognise it” (quoted in Jhazbhay 2007, 258; also see Clapham et. al. 2011, 24). 
Therefore, since 2003 the South African government has been made aware by its own legal 
staff that Somaliland qualifies for statehood, and this has influenced the government’s stance 
on understanding, rather than dismissing, Somaliland’s recognition bid.  
 
Instead of not allowing dissident nationalists any discussion quarter, the South African 
government since 1994 has traditionally been motivated by ”a diplomacy of conflict 
resolution and reconciliation”, and made itself “open to consultations with all parties involved 
in such intractable conflicts” (Jhazbhay 2007, 284). South African media have been somewhat 
impressed by the abilities of Somaliland’s leaders in stabilizing the country, especially when 
contrasted with Somalia, and in the past decade Somaliland has enjoyed an especially close 
relationship with South Africa (Ibid., 285; ICG 2006, 14).  
 
Both previous Somaliland presidents Egal and Kahin have made several official visits to 
South Africa, and the medical treatment of late President Egal in a South African military 
hospital in Pretoria, where he eventually died, is indicative of a close relationship between the 
two states (Jhazbhay 2007, 286). Further indication of this close relationship is the fact that 
the South African Department of Foreign Affairs would even investigate Somaliland’s case 
for independence in the first place, especially in light of the AU’s already noted reluctance to 
engage with secessionist movements which may violate territorial integrity of its member 
states. South Africa may still be unwilling to take the first step in recognising Somaliland, but 
as a rare state which has fostered a long term engagement with Somaliland, it has encouraged 
and influenced the AU to send fact finding missions to the country and remains a key ally in 
the AU (Bradbury 2008, 255). 
 
6.5 Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia currently stands as the most strategic (and perhaps most sympathetic) African actor 
in Somaliland’s recognition bid. In the murky world of international relations and political 
calculations Ethiopia has several scenarios in mind when dealing with Somaliland. These 
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issues can broadly be divided into three overlapping categories: Ethiopia’s own needs and 
bilateral relationship with Somaliland, Ethiopia’s security calculus vis-à-vis Somalia in 
general, and Ethiopia’s geo-political calculus vis-à-vis Egypt and the Arab League. 
 
During the 1980s, Ethiopia directly and indirectly aided the Somali National Movement in its 
struggle with the Siyad Barre regime by allowing it sanctuary on Ethiopian territory 
(Bradbury 2008, 61, 62, 93). Since the fall of Barre, and Somaliland’s declaration of 
independence, Ethiopia has become a close partner to Somaliland, especially as the two 
countries are closely connected by issues of Somali pastoralist migration, refugees, and the 
Khat trade.31 It has been in the interest of both countries to deal with the refugee and 
pastoralist grazing rights questions, and this cooperation has brought them both benefits. Also, 
Ethiopia is Africa’s second largest country in terms of population, yet it is a land locked 
country, and in order to feed its rapid development is in desperate need of sea outlets for 
purposes of trade and energy security. Somaliland, on the other hand, is in dire need of 
business for its ports, and its main port of Berbera offers a valuable outlet for Ethiopia’s 
needs. 
 
Ethiopia has signed various bilateral trade agreements with Somaliland, has opened a liaison 
office in Hargeisa (allowing Somaliland to do the same in Addis Ababa), and is interested in 
upgrading the road infrastructure linking Ethiopia and the Somaliland port of Berbera where it 
expects some twenty percent of its trade to flow through (CNN 2000; ICG 2006, 2; Jhazbhay 
2003, 79; Jhzbhay 2007, 263). In August 2003 the European Union for the first time shipped 
food aid to Ethiopia through Berbera. It was reported at the time that some 15 000 tones of aid 
had arrived in Ethiopia without “a hitch”; according to the then President of Somaliland, “a 
testimony for the credibility and confidence on the security situation” (AFP 2003). The 
significance of Berbera for Ethiopia is great; the congestion of the Djibouti port is a serious 
problem, and Ethiopia’s troubled relationship with Eritrea means it can never plan long-term 
use of Eritrean ports. However, the recent announcement of the development of a joint South 
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya Lamu port and oil refinery may in the future threaten Ethiopia’s 
dependence on Somaliland’s ports (BBC 2012b). 
 
On the other hand, Ethiopia has also, in 2006, upgraded its representation in Hargeisa at the 
ambassadorial level (Jhazbhay 2007, 264). This should be seen against the current of regular 
diplomatic visits by Somaliland officials to Addis Ababa, but also by reciprocal visits of 
Ethiopian officials to Somaliland. This close bilateral and diplomatic relationship is a strong 
                                                 
31 Khat (Catha Edulis) is a chewable plant which can be considered, depending on whom one asks, a mild 
stimulant or a serious drug. For the significance of Khat for Somaliland’s economy and the extensive links 
between Khat traders in Ethiopia and Somaliland see Hansen 2010, 594-595. 
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boost for Somaliland’s recognition aspirations, especially as Ethiopia is an important AU 
member and regional power.  
 
Ethiopia’s security calculus vis-à-vis Somalia is generally motivated by a concern for Somali 
irredentism, and regional stability. Therefore, its close relationship and unofficial recognition 
of Somaliland should be seen as an effort in recognising and supporting regional stability, and 
guarding itself from a resurgence of Somali irredentism. Firstly, Somaliland has emerged 
from the post-Barre Somalia as the most stable and secure political entity, and its stability has 
allowed the return of many Somali refugees from Ethiopia. By recognising, or fostering hope 
in future recognition of Somaliland, Ethiopia strengthens the case for a confederative or 
federal Somali state which may not constitute as big of a threat to Ethiopian interests as a 
united Somalia could. 
 
Finally, the importance of Ethiopia’s geo-political calculus vis-à-vis Egypt and the Arab 
League needs to be understood in its full context. As Jhazbhay notes 
 
The diverse Somali protagonists, Somaliland included, are essentially proxies 
in what has been a long and protracted geo-political power-struggle between 
the Nile Basin powers of ‘downstream’ Egypt – dependent as it is on the Nile 
in terms of its security interests – and its Arab League allies, and ‘upstream’ 
Ethiopia. The latter’s land-locked status and sense of encirclement by Arab-
Islamic forces drives its vested interests in the outcome of the Somali 
question. Hence Ethiopia’s vested interest in a federalist resolution of conflict 
throughout the Somali region, as a safeguard against any future resurgence of 
Somali irredentism and Egypt’s vested interest in a Somali unitary state 
throughout the entire expanse of the Somali coast, including Somaliland, as a 
bulwark against Ethiopia and any possibility that Addis Ababa might disrupt 
Egypt’s access to Nile waters (2007, 259-260). 
 
This proxy struggle between Ethiopia and Egypt although difficult to discern at times, is a real 
and delicate aspect of the Somaliland question. Both countries favour a particular settlement 
of the Somali question (Ethiopia a confederation or federation, and Egypt a unitary state) and 
try and shape political developments in Somalia to suit their own strategic and security 
interests. 
 
Ethiopia is so far positioning itself well by building considerable influence with the TFG, 
while at the same time building strong relations and ties with Somaliland. This allows the 
Ethiopians to keep a finger on the political pulse of Somalia and always be informed about 
developments which may go against their interests. However, on the other hand, Ethiopia is 
also very weary of antagonising Arab League powers and Gulf States, due to its heavy 
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economic interdependence on the Gulf region, and this is one of the reasons why it is unlikely 
to go it alone in recognising Somaliland (Jhzbhay 2007, 261). 
 
Officially, “Ethiopia is unwilling to be the first to recognize Somaliland. Somalia would 
immediately attribute nefarious motives to Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland, arguing that 
it wishes to balkanize Somalia and weaken Somali unity” (Shinn 2002, 4). Unofficially, 
Ethiopia has raised the issue of extending Somaliland some form of recognition, and appears 
keen on advocating at least partial recognition for Somaliland. According to a leaked 
diplomatic cable from the US embassy in Addis Ababa, in a January 2009 meeting with US 
Air Force Assistant Secretary Phil Carter, the Ethiopia Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
proposed Somaliland be extended some form of “semi recognition”: 
 
… Prime Minister Meles made the case for "semi-recognition" of 
Somaliland as a critical step necessary to enhance the international 
community’s ability to support Somaliland on regional security/stability and 
in its own domestic efforts toward democratization. Meles argued that the 
international community’s status quo relationship with Somaliland is 
untenable and that Somaliland needs a way around the issue of legal 
recognition to allow the international community to "recognize some 
authority within Somaliland with which it can engage." … Meles argued 
that Somaliland’s democratic process cannot be sustained without some kind 
of interim recognition which can allow for the provision of international 
assistance to bolster Somaliland’s own democratic process. Meles noted that 
he has already broached the notion of an interim- or semi-recognition, along 
the lines of what the Palestinian Authority enjoys, with Somaliland 
President Kahin Riyale, and that Riyale has become increasingly receptive 
to the strategy. Meles argued to Carter that the next steps must be for others 
in the international community to help convince the Somalilanders of such 
an approach. Then, Somaliland needs a "good sponsor" within the African 
community to advance the cause. Meles suggested that Djibouti would be 
the best choice, and acknowledged that Ethiopia would be the worst (as the 
move risked only fuelling detractors’ arguments that Ethiopia is bent on 
breaking up Somalia). Once the strategy had support among African states, 
Meles argued that the onus would be on the U.S. and UK to make the 
Somaliland semi-recognition case to the Europeans and others in the 
international community (United States 2009a). 
 
As noted in the cable, Ethiopia sees itself as the worst choice of a first country to 
extend Somaliland some form of de jure recognition and this was already stated by 
Zenawi in 2006 at a roundtable discussion at the University of South Africa. As 
Zenawi stated back then, because of Ethiopia’s “historical baggage” on Somali issues, 
other countries could be more adventurous than Ethiopia in recognising Somaliland, 
but Ethiopia would, behind the scenes “support justice and self-determination of 
Somaliland” (quoted in Jhazbhay 2007, 265). 
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6.6 Djibouti and Kenya 
 
Somalia’s last two neighbours, Djibouti and Kenya, both have  a strong interest in Somali 
affairs, and have at some point in time played important roles in attempting to bring 
about/influence a political settlement in the country. As it currently stands, both countries are 
also officially committed to a unified Somalia, however, with varying degrees of support for 
Somaliland. 
 
The former French Somali protectorate, Djibouti, is Somaliland’s north-western neighbour 
and some sixty percent of its population is Somali (Shinn 2002, 4). Relations between the two 
countries have varied, and remain somewhat “correct but not warm”; largely due to Djibouti’s 
hosting of the 2000 Arta conference, and its support for the TFG (Ibid.). Djibouti was 
considered one of the principal backers of the TNG in the international arena before it 
collapsed, and during its organisation of the Arta conference relations with Somaliland froze 
(Geldenhuys 2009, 142). However, the collapse of the TNG and the triggering of the 14th 
attempt at reconstituting Somalia  
 
Placed Djibouti and its Arab-backers on the defensive vis-à-vis Ethiopia’s 
backing for the federal ‘solution’, which emerged as the successor to the 
TNG… The terminal disintegration of Arta and its TNG progeny inexorably 
played into the hands of Ethiopia and its Somali regional coalition allies. 
These dynamics worked to eventually depolarise the tense relations between 
Djibouti and Somaliland, although the distrust that the Arta process had 
generated appeared to linger…(Jhzbhay 2007, 268). 
 
Relations between the two countries did begin to thaw, and in a 2005 trip to Djibouti the 
Somaliland President was reportedly accorded an official welcome at Djibouti airport before 
proceeding to meet the president at his palace. This reception “included all ceremonial 
symbols of an official visit by a foreign Head of State”, and was seen “as an important 
symbolic victory to President Riyale” as Djibouti was long regarded as “one of the principal 
opponents to the recognition of Somaliland” (Afrol News 2005). Furthermore, while still 
officially committed to the TFG and a unified Somalia, Djibouti has permitted Somaliland to 
open liaison offices in the country and engage in a range of bilateral ties, and this has given 
rise to the view that Djibouti is “slowly beginning to incline towards support of Somaliland’s 
recognition” (Jhazbhay 2007, 271; ICG 2006, 14).  
 
However, such views may be premature. While in December 2008 Somaliland’s President 
Riyale was again greeted with a high-level welcoming party of Djibouti officials, and spent 
some four hours in discussion with Djibouti’s president, this did not bring his country closer 
to recognition by Djibouti (Somaliland Times 2008). Confidential US embassy cables reveal 
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that a month after the visit, Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Youssouf clarified to the US 
ambassador in Djibouti that Djibouti’s policy towards Somalia continued to be guided by 
three principles: staunch adherence to a “one-Somalia policy” (the Foreign Minister actually 
stated that it would take a “major shock” to cause Djibouti to revisit this position); reluctance 
to be the first state to recognize an independent Somaliland (a position they already conveyed 
to Somaliland officials); and willingness to engage  with Somaliland on a “de facto” basis in 
view of close trade, cultural, and demographic connections (United States 2009a, point 3). 
Therefore, while Djibouti may be inclined to widen diplomatic links with Somaliland on an 
unofficial basis, it is still officially dedicated to a unified Somalia, and not interested in 
extending Somaliland formal recognition. 
 
Kenya, as noted in chapter two, has a significant Somali population in its Northern District, 
and was embroiled in a secessionist conflict with its Somali population in the mid 1960s. 
Kenya is also connected with Somalia through extensive economic and business links via its 
Somali Diaspora (especially in the Eastleigh district of Nairobi). Also, rather recently, the 
string of high profile abductions and attacks conducted by alleged Somali militias along 
Kenya’s tourist coast has brought considerable domestic attention to Somali affairs. Kenya’s 
late 2011 military invasion of south Somalia has directly involved the country in Somali 
political developments, where it currently supports the TFG and has joined forces with AU 
troops under the AMISOM banner (AMISOM 2012). 
 
Kenya has in the past facilitated Somali peace talks, the Mbagathi talks, and through its main 
facilitator, Special Envoy on behalf of East Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), stated that it did not recognize Somaliland. Ambassador Bethuel 
Kiplagat, during the 2003 negotiations, made it clear that IGAD would pressure for a united 
Somalia, and that it did not recognize Somaliland (Jhazbhay 2007, 273). Although such 
views, coupled with recent Kenyan activity supporting the TFG and AMISOM in Somalia 
suggest a strong preference for a unitary solution to the Somali question, there is evidence 
that Kenya, similarly to Ethiopia, may favor a regionalized Somalia, and an independent 
Somaliland. 
 
In a March 2004 article M.S. Ahmed argued that “Kenya, which has a longstanding territorial 
dispute with Somalia, has an interest in confirming Somalia’s de facto disintegration into two 
separate entities (Somaliland and Somalia), as it has in the division of Sudan into a Christian-
controlled south and a Muslim north”. The author linked this strategic calculation with the 
ongoing Nile controversy between Egypt and “upstream” states such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, 
and Uganda: 
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Such a break-up will provide it [Kenya] (along with Tanzania, Uganda and 
Ethiopia) with an opportunity to demand the revision of the treaty governing 
the distribution of the River Nile’s waters. In fact it has already announced 
(as Tanzania has also done) that it will withdraw from the treaty, sensing no 
doubt that Washington’s success in forcing Khartoum to concede to 
southern Sudan the right to secede will eventually consign the treaty to the 
past (Ahmed 2004).  
 
Although Ahmed’s reasoning about Kenya’s position on Somaliland might sound somewhat 
conspiratory, it is to an extent backed up by a March 2003 “Weekly Special Report” 
circulated by the US State Department’s Office of International Information Programmes 
which stated that  
 
Kenya does not want a strong neighbour that one day revives the Greater 
Somalia concept. For this reason, it is probably quietly sympathetic with an 
independent Somaliland. But as long as it is trying to solve the larger issue 
of peace in Somalia, it must remain completely neutral (quoted in Jhazbhay 
2007, 275). 
 
It is quite possible that Kenya, much like Ethiopia, is not too keen on a united Somalia, and 
what the two countries have in common is “the necessity to maintain a stable stalemate 
between Somaliland and Somalia” (Ibid.). In fact, it would appear that officially, as far as 
Somaliland’s immediate neighbours are concerned, status quo in the preferred option when 
discussing Somaliland’s international recognition. 
 
6.7 The African Union 
 
Alas, the analysis of key players in Somaliland’s international recognition game reaches its 
arguably most important actor. Most of Somaliland’s neighbours are quite happy to leave 
Somaliland’s question to be decided by the AU (knowing that this may sustain the status quo 
for a while). International donors fall in line here as well, as most of them are either not 
interested enough in Somaliland, or simply do not wish to be perceived as meddling in 
African affairs. As any recognition of Somaliland by a non-African country would be seen as 
neo-colonialism or unwelcome interference in African affairs, this view is understandable, 
especially regarding ex-colonial powers such as the UK.  
 
So far, the AU has failed to deal constructively with the Somaliland question, and shoulders 
much of the blame for the country’s international isolation. If one had to use a single phrase to 
characterise the AU’s position towards Somaliland, it would be “bi-polar”. The mixed signals 
the AU has been sending Somaliland leaders in the past ten years are indicative of its bi-polar 
personality. The AU has accepted Somalia as a full member and awarded the TFG’s 
representative a chair at its Assembly, while at the same snubbing Somaliland statehood 
Seceding but not Succeeding                                                                                             MA Thesis Nikola Pijovic            
 
 78 
aspirations. Yet the AU’s own officials concluded that Somaliland’s case for independence 
has merit and should be seriously considered. As Geldenhuys concludes, the “AU has so far 
failed to rise to the challenge, preferring a Somaliland left in international limbo to an 
organization torn by such an emotive issue. Yet the AU was the very institution to which the 
international community turned for guidance on the future of Somaliland” (2009, 140). 
 
While the EU, amid the bloodshed of Yugoslavia’s dissolution moved quickly to establish a 
set of policies governing the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe  and former USSR, 
the AU still lacks, in the words of one official “a common policy on issues of “second-
generation independence”(quoted in ICG 2006, 14). Because of this lack of common policy, 
coupled with an unwillingness to create innovative ways of dealing with territorial integrity 
and state secession, the AU has repeatedly failed to come to terms with events on the ground 
in Somalia. As Bradbury concludes, the AU’s strategy in the Kenyan sponsored Mbagathi 
peace talks “was to ‘park’ the issue of Somaliland, in order to protect the stability in that 
region. The message from Somaliland, as always, is that it won’t wait, that it pulled out of the 
car park some time ago. It is steering its own course, and hopes that the international 
community will follow this” (quoted in Jhazbhay 2007, 250). 
 
As early as 2002, Somaliland invited the AU to send a fact finding mission to the country 
(ICG 2006, 2). Its diplomats paid successive visits to the AU in 2003, 2004, and early 2005, 
and on that last visit Somaliland’s President Kahin sought observer status to be awarded to his 
country so it could better follow events on the continent and have a permanent representation 
at the Union. It took the AU a few years, but a fact finding mission was in the end dispatched 
in April 2005, and was headed by the then Deputy Chairperson of the African Union 
Commission, Patrick Mazimhaka (African Union 2005). As noted in the previous chapter, the 
mission’s report acknowledged the peace and stability achieved in Somaliland, and was 
generally supportive of Somaliland’s independence claims. It stated that “the fact that the 
“union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified” and also malfunctioned when it 
went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically 
unique and self-justified in African political history” (Ibid.). The mission further 
recommended that Somaliland’s case “should not be linked to the notion of “opening a 
pandora’s box”. As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with this 
outstanding case, and noted that  
 
the lack of recognition ties the hands of the authorities and people of 
Somaliland as they cannot effectively and sustainably transact with the 
outside to pursue the reconstruction and development goals… the AU 
should be disposed to judge the case of Somaliland from an objective 
historical viewpoint and a moral angle vis-à-vis the aspirations of the 
people (Ibid.). 
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The observations of the AU’s 2005 fact finding mission to Somaliland were generally 
positive, and left the Union with a clear recommendation: judge Somaliland’s case on its own 
merits, and don’t use the notion of “opening a Pandora’s box” as an alibi for not dealing with 
this issue. However, Somaliland’s bid for observer status to the AU was unsuccessful, and the 
AU never actually gave Somaliland any feedback following its 2005 fact finding mission 
(Clapham et. al. 2011, 11). In fact, Somaliland’s future status was discussed by AU foreign 
ministers in 2006, and Kenya, Rwanda, and Zambia contributed to the debate and discussion 
by stating “that the Somaliland peace and stability has to be acknowledged and recognized, 
and that the African Union has to find a way to reward and consolidate its stability and its 
emerging democracy” (Voice Of America 2006). Furthermore, at an AU Executive Council 
Meeting in Addis Ababa  in January 2007, the then Chairman of the Executive Council from 
the Republic of Congo, concluded that  
 
…there is a reality in Somaliland that cannot be ignored. …. We cannot 
afford to close our eyes or shy away from that reality. It is in the interest of 
Africa to pay attention to these issues. There were positive developments 
in Somaliland, including the restoration of stability and peace, the 
establishment of democratic institutions and processes and the efforts 
deployed internally towards reconstruction. Some of these achievements in 
Somaliland should inspire the rest of Somalia. This is an issue that is now 
known to the African Union policy organs and it should be discussed at an 
appropriate time (quoted in Somaliland Times 2007b). 
 
Later in the same year, Alpha Konare, Chairman of the AU Commission, told the body’s 
Executive Council that the African continent had to deal with the reality of Somaliland’s 
existence and to engage with its unsettled international legal status (Ibid.). Unfortunately, 
since then nothing new has happened and the issue of Somaliland at the 2008 AU summit in 
Accra was relegated to “any other business” on the agenda (Clapham et.al. 2011, 11). The 
only relatively positive development (for Somaliland) since then took place in 2010, when the 
Peace and Security Council of the AU directed the Commission’s Chairperson to “broaden 
consultations with Somaliland and Puntland as part of the overall efforts to promote stability 
and further peace and reconciliation in Somalia” (quoted in Clapham et. al. 2011, 11). 
However, what this actually means for Somaliland’s independence is unclear and hardly 
constitutes a new strategy of engagement with the country. “Broadening consultations” is an 
ambiguous phrase, and could include only sporadic meetings and discussions of regional 
security developments, without ever needing to tackle Somaliland’s independence question. 
 
So far, it would seem that there are elements at the AU level which do favour a resolution of 
the Somaliland question. As one senior AU official noted back in 2006, “For fifteen years 
Somaliland has been told to wait until a stable government is established in the South. They 
should not have to wait any longer....Somaliland has a right to have its case heard, and as 
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African leaders we have a duty to listen to what they have to say” (quoted in ICG 2006, 3). 
However, the AU’s stubborn unwillingness or inability to deal with this issue leads us right 
back to the bi-polarity of its dealings with Somaliland. For, although the sporadic rhetoric 
coming from some AU officials might favour dealing with Somaliland and possibly its 
recognition, the wider policies of the organisation actually work in a different direction. 
 
The AU has in the past decade developed an integrationist trajectory for African inter-state 
relations. What currently tops the AU agenda is political and economic development and 
regional integration. This means that, as Jhazbhay states, “within this context of continental 
‘African unity’, all outstanding African self-determination questions will have to be re-
thought and re-conceptualised in terms of how they contribute to or detract from African 
integration, and reinforce or overcome Africa’s already debilitating fragmentation” (2007, 
252). This is why, for example, Ethiopia is unwilling to initiate any major diplomatic moves 
towards recognising Somaliland as the regional integration in East and North-East Africa is 
still in the air in terms of how it will be economically and politically configured (Ibid.). So the 
AU’s drive towards greater regional integration works directly against Somaliland’s 
secession, because Somaliland’s case directly challenges its integrationist discourse. 
 
While the AU does maintain contacts with the Somaliland government, its “continental 
internationalist agenda, linked to the evolution of ‘regional integration communities’ among 
its sub-regions, is likely to rule out AU official recognition of Somaliland no matter what the 
legal and political case for such decisions might be” (Jhazbhay 2007, 288). Somaliland’s 
future recognition, therefore, is unlikely to come from the AU if it devotes itself blindly to its 
integrationist ideology. However, with the recent push by foreign donors for anti-piracy 
activities in Somalia, and their growing recognition of Somaliland’s importance for regional 
stability and battling piracy, the AU may be pressured or disposed to develop a somewhat 
different approach to Somaliland. The AU may be slow to react, but it is not completely blind 
to developments on the ground, and Somaliland’s potential role in stabilizing the Somali coast 
could eventually win it more support in the Union. The main problem for the AU, and worst 
case scenario, could be a situation where member states decide to break away with its 
ineffective Somalia policies and individually recognise Somaliland. This could have profound 
consequences for the organisation’s stability and credibility, and create considerable tensions 
within the Union itself.   
 
To sum up, we should examine Somaliland’s prospects for recognition by the AU. As it 
currently stands the AU troops in Somalia are in effect the “army” of the TFG, and in that 
regard, the AU is in fact a warring party heavily supporting a unified Somalia. Therefore, 
currently the AU is not interested in recognising Somaliland. Even a limited concession such 
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as awarding Somaliland observer status at the AU is too innovative for the organization to 
entertain. For Somaliland to be taken seriously by the AU “it must persuade the organisation 
that its request is justifiable under international law, serves the greater interest of the AU as a 
whole (or at least of enough individual member states to swing a vote) and would contribute 
to the stability and development of the region” (ICG 2006, 10). Somaliland is already treading 
along that path, and key AU states such as Ethiopia and South Africa might consider 
assessing Somaliland’s recognition case “in terms of how this could either contribute to or 
detract from advancing the stability of the Somali coast and, based on such an assessment, 
whether or not Ethiopia and South Africa, together with the AU, could fashion a diplomacy of 
reconciling Somaliland and Somalia accordingly” (Jhazbhay 2007, 303). However, such 
developments depend on many factors completely outside of Somaliland’s control, and this 
examination of the AU’s stance towards Somaliland is a good indication of the complexities 
and obstacles Somaliland faces in achieving international recognition. 
 
6.8 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyze the roles of key players in Somaliland’s 
recognition game, and examine their positions on Somaliland’s independence. What seems to 
be the common tune amongst all countries and international organisations examined is that in 
the end, it is up to Africans (read - the AU) to decide Somaliland’s international status. 
 
The western countries analyzed in this chapter are a heterogeneous assortment of states with 
different interests and historical involvements in Somalia, which however, profess a common 
official stance of non-interference in Somali affairs. Unofficially, many western states have a 
growing recognition of the importance Somaliland has for regional stability, and would be 
quite keen to reward its good governance and state-building achievements with international 
recognition. However, this growing recognition of Somaliland’s stabilizing role is largely 
confined to the developmental sector, and is yet to receive political support.  
 
Somaliland’s relationship with the UN and especially its representatives in Somalia has had a 
troubled history. The UN has so far not extended Somaliland partial recognition it requested 
back in 2000, which leaves the country in a difficult situation with regards to dealing with 
international financial and development institutions. Non-African UN members are highly 
reluctant to get involved in Somali affairs, which in light of the 1993 US led fiasco is 
understandable. The UN appears to be content on leaving the Somaliland question, and the 
whole situation in Somalia for that matter, to the AU, and this is evidenced by the Security 
Council’s preference to leave the peace-making and peace-keeping business in Somalia to 
African troops. 
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On the bilateral front, Somaliland’s relationship with African states in the neighbourhood and 
beyond is complex. South Africa is the most willing non-neighbour state to entertain 
recognition of Somaliland. Although it too officially does not recognise Somaliland (Times 
Live 2011), the two states have cultivated a close diplomatic relationship: South Africa has 
sent three election observer teams to Somaliland elections, and Somaliland presidents have 
travelled to the country on several occasions. Furthermore, South Africa’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs legal adviser actually travelled to Somaliland and investigated its claims to 
statehood, reporting favourably that Somaliland was indeed entitled to international 
recognition. South Africa remains one of the few states, in addition to Kenya, Djibouti, and 
Ethiopia, which recognise Somaliland travel documents (Clapham et.al. 2011, 22). 
 
Ethiopia and Egypt are locked in a strategic diplomatic proxy war over Somalia’s fate, and 
this is evidenced by their respective positions on Somaliland. Egypt does not recognise 
Somaliland, and is one of the main backers of the TFG, either bilaterally or through the Arab 
League. Ethiopia, on the other hand, is happy to officially maintain the status quo of not 
recognising Somaliland, while behind the scenes working very closely with Somalilanders on 
forging close trade and diplomatic ties. Ethiopia remains the most favourably disposed Africa 
country towards Somaliland’s recognition, and has a long history of good relations with 
Somaliland leadership. While Ethiopia is unlikely to recognise Somaliland without AU 
support, it is also a key player in the AU, and can use its influence to Somaliland’s advantage. 
However, because of its “historical baggage” with Somalia, it is very reluctant to be the first 
country to recognise Somaliland. 
 
Kenya and Djibouti are in a somewhat similar situation vis-à-vis Somaliland. Both countries 
have in the past organised and facilitated a Somali peace deal, and backed the Somali 
transitional governments. Officially they are still dedicated to the TFG, but have improved 
their relations with Somaliland. Kenya’s recent military invasion of Somalia and the “re-
hatting” of its army under the AMISOM banner has made it more aligned with TFG interests. 
However, both Djibouti and Kenya might favour a broken-down Somalia for fear of possible 
future Somali irredentism. In this regard, and with Somaliland’s growing importance for the 
stability of the region and anti-piracy operations, the countries might be willing to entertain 
stronger support for Somaliland’s recognition. 
 
However, none of the above discussed African countries are willing to act on Somaliland’s 
recognition without the AU’s sanctioning first. This leads us back to the AU as the principal 
player in Somaliland’s recognition game. The AU is currently not interested in Somaliland’s 
recognition, and while its troops are heavily involved in supporting the TFG in Somalia, it is 
unlikely that this situation will change anytime soon. The AU’s record of sending mixed 
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signals to Somaliland is a reflection of the lack of unity within the organisation on how best to 
proceed in dealing with Somalia, and is also indicative of a lack of idea on how to reconcile 
its policy of regional integration with the realities on the ground in Somalia which may not 
favour such discourses. In the end, it would appear that Somaliland’s international recognition 
is not a pressing issue for anyone but Somaliland, and this may be the main reason why its 
international recognition is still lacking. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
During the course of writing this thesis there have been many political developments in 
Somalia, but none related to changes in Somaliland’s international status. On the domestic 
front Kenya and Ethiopia invaded Somalia and teamed up with AMISOM troops in fighting 
Al-Shabaab, but so far no conclusive result of that operation has emerged. Kenya’s operations 
in the south have stalled significantly and its troops have now joined the AMISOM mandate, 
while the Ethiopians have been expected to leave the country for some months now (News24 
2012). On the international front, in the past four months there have been two international 
conferences on Somalia and both have only served to remind us of the international 
community’s inability or unwillingness to support Somaliland’s recognition. 
 
The February London Conference on Somalia did little to foster Somaliland’s recognition 
aspirations, and provided limited opportunities (mostly on the margins of the event) for 
Somaliland leaders to discuss independence. The May Istanbul Conference on Somalia only 
affirmed this low international interest in Somaliland as it mainly dealt with developmental 
issues and challenges facing Somalia, and mentioned Somaliland only once in its final 
conference declaration (RCB Radio 2012, Final Declaration point 10). What appears to be at 
the forefront of the international community’s concerns regarding the region is the future of 
Somalia’s central governance project, since the TFG is due to dissolve in August this year, 
and no one yet knows what kind of government will supersede this dysfunctional body. 
 
From the rhetoric of these international conferences on Somalia it can be discerned that 
Somaliland’s role in regional stability and governance is generally recognized, but this is 
where any kind of recognition stops. The international community’s Horn of Africa agenda is 
primarily concerned with what happens in August when the TFG’s mandate expires, and the 
AU is certainly not pressing itself into making any kind of decision on Somaliland’s status in 
the foreseeable future. The main problem for Somaliland, and perhaps one of the key reasons 
why its international recognition is still lacking is, as Professor Jhazbhay argued back in 2003, 
that it is “too small to wield any muscle against the international organisations that ignore it” 
(2003, 79). As long as there are international conferences on Somalia that scarcely mention or 
discuss Somaliland, the territory’s international recognition will remain absent.  
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine and analyze the complexities surrounding 
Somaliland’s international recognition, why that recognition is still lacking, and how the 
country’s (non) recognition is influenced by the foreign policies of neighbourly states and the 
wider relevant international community. Undertaking such a complex analysis can be difficult 
and to make the examination easily understandable and readable the thesis was divided into 
Seceding but not Succeeding                                                                                             MA Thesis Nikola Pijovic            
 
 85 
several background and analytical chapters which highlighted important historical, legal, and 
political issues regarding Somaliland’s international recognition. 
 
Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter of the thesis outlined a historical and 
political background to Somalia and Somaliland developments since independence. Through 
the examination of the history of Somaliland’s achievements in state-building and governance 
since 1991 this chapter allowed the reader to understand the basis for Somaliland’s 
international recognition aspirations. 
 
The third chapter outlined a theoretical framework for understanding how we can 
conceptualize states, and how Somaliland can be understood against current theories of 
statehood and state recognition Perhaps most importantly for the purpose of this thesis, this 
chapter also established that state recognition is primarily a political act, governed more by 
political considerations than legal provisions, and as such constitutes one of the main reasons 
why international state recognition is such a complex issue. Since there is no international law 
mandating state recognition, and there is no supranational body which would govern the 
recognition of new state, it is up to individual states to determine which aspiring territory they 
will accept and recognize as a state, and they need not justify their decisions to anyone. 
 
Chapters four, five, and six provided a thorough analysis of key issues regarding Somaliland’s 
international recognition. Chapter four outlined and analyzed the strength and validity of 
Somaliland’s legal case for independence and secession from Somalia, as seen against 
international law governing state secession and statehood. The fifth chapter discussed some of 
the main political, security, societal, and economic considerations states take into account 
when deciding whether or not to recognize Somaliland. The main argument to come out of 
this chapter is that Somaliland’s international recognition is such a complex issue exactly 
because so many arguments are made against recognizing the country, and while many of 
these arguments may seem weak, the apparent seriousness and validity they are awarded by 
the international community complicates things and makes them a huge stumbling block for 
Somaliland’s recognition aspirations. 
 
The sixth and final chapter of the thesis analyzed the roles of key players in Somaliland’s 
international recognition game by discussing their positions on Somaliland’s independence. 
This is arguably the most helpful chapter in understanding why Somaliland’s international 
recognition is still lacking because it offers a real-politik examination of the official and 
unofficial policies of important states and international organizations relating to Somaliland’s 
independence bid.  
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To answer the research question proposed at the beginning of this thesis, and uncover why 
Somaliland’s international recognition is still lacking, and how this situation is influenced by 
the foreign policies of its neighbours and the wider relevant international community we can 
make three points.  
 
Firstly, the wider international community is simply not interested enough in Somaliland or 
the region to pressure for any change in the territory’s international status. Perhaps another 
significant upsurge in piracy, or major terrorist activities in Somalia and the region may force 
the international community to place a greater share of its developmental and political support 
behind Somaliland.  
 
Secondly, the AU’s bi-polar attitude towards Somaliland and its lacking policy on second-
hand African independence have contributed to its failure towards constructively dealing with 
Somalia’s security and political situation, and have caused immense harm to Somaliland’s 
international recognition aspirations. No doubt many members of the AU are happy not 
recognizing Somaliland, which certainly impacts the organizations attitude, but the AU’s 
repeated inability or unwillingness to formally address Somaliland’s recognition requests, 
coupled with its blind adherence to the sanctity of colonial borders have to a large extent 
prolonged the region’s troubles.  
 
Finally, for the time being Somaliland’s neighbours seem to be quite happy keeping the status 
quo as it allows them to manipulate the political leadership in Somalia (which was either put 
in place by their diplomacy or is currently kept in place by their military) while at the same 
time staying in good relations with Somaliland. Regional strategic interests of Somaliland’s 
neighbours trump Somaliland’s recognition aspirations and until these two factors are aligned 
the situation regarding Somaliland’s recognition is not likely to change. The fact that no 
African country seems to be ready to be the first to recognize Somaliland (while many are 
happy to be the second) may prove a considerable obstacle for Somaliland’s recognition in the 
foreseeable future. 
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RESUME 
AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland (30 April to 4 May 2005) 
 
I. Introduction 
1. An AU Fact-Finding Mission visited and stayed in Somaliland from 30 April to 4 may 
2005, to see the prevailing situation (political, socio-economic, security, humanitarian and 
other related issues) in the country and listen to the concerns of the leadership and people of 
Somaliland, and duly report back the findings of the Mission to the Chairperson of the 
African Union Commission, with recommendations for further action. The Deputy 
Chairperson of the Commission, H. E. Patrick Mazimhaka, led the Mission, accompanied by 
Dr A. M. Kambudzi, Analyst in the Peace and Security Department; Col. Jaotody Jean de 
Matha, Senior Military Expert, in the same Department; Mr Patrick Tigere, Head of the 
Humanitarian, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division in the Department of Political 
Affairs and Mr Dieudonné Kombo Yaya, Senior Political Officer, in the same Department. 
 
2. Contextually, it should be recalled that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)/African 
Union (AU) had a longstanding invitation from Somaliland to undertake a visit to the country 
and view the situation on the ground. The authorities of Somaliland have also paid successive 
visits to the Commission in 2003, 2004, and early 2005, seeking an Observer status for 
Somaliland within the AU, not only to be able to follow developments on the continent, but 
also to gain a platform from which the country could state its case for reclaiming its 26 June 
1960 independence and the recognition of the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign state. 
Given the call from Somaliland, and based on his indication to the AU Executive Council in 
mid- 2004, to dispatch a Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland, the Chairperson of the 
Commission, H. E. Alpha Oumar Konare, finally dispatched the Mission as indicated above. 
 
II. Consultations and Visits of the Mission 
3. The Mission held wide ranging consultations with the main political actors other segments 
of the society in Hargeisa (capital): the President of the Republic of Somaliland, members of 
the Cabinet members of the Somaliland Parliament, the Presidential Envoy for the Campaign 
for Recognition; intellectuals businesspersons and representatives of civic organisations and 
women associations. The Mission, accompanied by members of the welcoming Committee of 
Ministers, undertook visits to Berbera seaport at the Red Sea; town of Sheihk, in the interior; 
town of Burao, far in the interior south and the town of Borama, in the western part of the 
country. The visits, well received by huge crowds of town residents and rural folk, were the 
scene of intense consultations between the Mission and the respective mayors and other senior 
government officials, local political leaders; chiefs, elders and the representatives of civic 
organisations and women leaders. The Mission also visited some educational and vocational 
training centres. The message was the same at every place: “the irreversible independence 
of Somaliland; the irreversible sovereignty of Somaliland; no return to the Union with 
Somalia; the quest for recognition from the AU and the international community”. 
Those visits also gave an opportunity to the Mission to witness the legacy of the campaign of 
destruction by the Siad Barre army; the destruction wrought by the civil war and its 
consequences on the civilian population (camps housing IDPs and Returnees, landmine fields, 
mass graves, disrupted physical and social infrastructures); inversely, the same visits were a 
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window for the Mission the tremendous efforts deployed in the reconstruction of the country 
and the rehabilitation of the social fabric. 
 
4. In response, the Mission undertook to convey the message and sentiments of the authorities 
and people of Somaliland and to report on the situation that it had witnessed in the country to 
the Chairperson of the Commission.  
 
III. Overall assessment of the situation in Somaliland 
5. There was an evident conviction and emotion among the Somalilanders that their 
“country” has all the attributes of an independent sovereign State, which they say the 
international community should objectively consider. At the same time, there was a rejection 
in toto of the idea of re-uniting with Somalia. The famous words “No more Mogadishu; no 
more Somalia; Somaliland is an independent country; we want recognition; it is our right”, 
addressed to the Fact-Finding Mission through out its stay, visits and consultations bear 
testimony. 
 
6. Since the disintegration of Somalia provoked by the collapse of the Siad Barre 
administration in early 1991, leading to the break away of Somaliland into a selfdeclared 
independent Republic, there has been an accelerated process of state building. That process 
was anchored, and remains so, on the recognition by the Somalilanders of the inherited 
colonial borders at the time of independence from Britain in June 1960: 
 
a. Somaliland has a Constitution that emanated from grassroots consultations and was sealed 
in the referendum held in 2003; the Constitution serves as the basic Law in Somaliland and 
does enjoy respect in the political practice in Somaliland. The Constitution provides for the 
relevant arms of government and the effective separation of powers that go along it. 
 
b. Somaliland has territory as defined by the colonial borders inherited from the British 
colonial rule on accession to independence in 1960. In the north, the country is bordered by 
the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden adjoining into the Indian Ocean; Puntland State borders it 
on the east, the while Ethiopia neighbours it on the west. To the north-west, Somaliland is 
bordered by Djibouti. 
 
c. Somaliland has a population that is estimated by local sources at 3.5 million resident in the 
country and one million living in the Diaspora, the majority of which fled the civil war. The 
Somali language is spoken through out the country, whilst English and Arabic are also used in 
official and business transactions. It is not unusual to encounter those Somalis who can speak 
Swahili and Italian. 
 
e. Somaliland has only declared its own independence, after “reclaiming it from the collapsed 
union”. But the international community has not recognised that independence thus far. 
However, there is a standing army with a “mandate to defend the independence and territorial 
integrity of Somaliland”.  
 
f. Somaliland has achieved peace and stability, through a home-grown disarmament, 
demobilisation and re-integration process and internally driven democratisation; 
 
g. Somaliland has a real economic potential, based on its surface and sub-surface resources 
and maritime resources. 
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IV. Findings of the Mission 
7. The AU Fact-Finding Mission found out the following aspects during its three working 
days in Somaliland and in the different sectors: 
 
a. Since its declaration of independence in 1991, Somaliland has been steadfastly laying the 
foundations of a democratic State, clothed with the relevant attributes of a “modern State”. 
Those foundations include the Constitution of Somaliland which entrenches, among other 
aspects, the separation of power between the three arms of government; balance of political 
forces built upon the functional co-habitation of traditional governance institutions, as 
embodied in the political role of the clan elders and elected representatives; the existence of 
active opposition political parties with some capacity to influence public policy and a budding 
independent press; 
 
b. The plethora of problems confronting Somaliland in the political, socioeconomic, military, 
humanitarian and other sectors stem from two main factors, namely, the legacy of a political 
union with Somalia, which malfunctioned, brought destruction and ruin, thereby 
overburdening the population; the lack of recognition of Somaliland as an “independent 
sovereign State” by the international community to enable it undertake international, 
political, social, economic and other relevant functions and transactions and the 
significant, and yet untapped economic potential. 
 
c. Somaliland and Somalia entered into a “Union” in July 1960, based on a shared ambition 
among the Somalis to build a “Greater Somalia”, which was to incorporate all the Somali 
communities in the Horn of Africa. In the course of time, the Union malfunctioned. The 
legacy of the abortive union and the resulting civil war left behind a trail of physical 
destruction and social dislocation, all of which require more resources in order for the 
population to recover and enjoy better conditions of life. 
 
e. Though credit has to be given to Somaliland for promoting a democratic order, and within a 
shorter span of time, there are gaps that need attention from both the policy makers and the 
individual citizens. One critical gap lies in gender relations in terms of the predominance of 
men in the various structures, institutions and processes. In the words of the President of the 
Republic of Somaliland, steps are being taken to foster conditions for women’s participation 
across all sectors of political and socio-economic life, including a deliberate policy, already in 
place, in favour of an incremental enrolment of female students in schools and all tertiary 
institutions. 
 
f. There is a visibly emotional attachment to the reclaimed independence and a firm 
determination among the people of Somaliland not to return to the failed union with Somalia, 
whether or not recognition is granted. In the words of the President, “should Africa and the 
international community insist on Somaliland re-establishing the union with Somalia, the 
leaders and people of Somaliland would “opt to fight again to preserve their independence. 
In fact, the Horn of Africa would be engulfed again in the old notions of a Greater Somalia 
and the pursuit of narrow-gauged national interests by countries in the region, with all the 
consequences that may befall the region. 
 
V. Observations and Recommendations 
8. Going by the clear presentation and articulate demands of the authorities and people of 
Somaliland concerning their political, social and economic history, Somaliland has been made 
a “pariah region” by default. The Union established in 1960 brought enormous injustice and 
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suffering to the people of the region. The fact that the “union between Somaliland and 
Somalia was never ratified” and also malfunctioned when it went into went into action from 
1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified 
in African political history. Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of 
“opening a pandora’s box”. As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with 
this outstanding case. 
 
9. The lack of recognition ties the hands of the authorities and people of Somaliland as they 
cannot effectively and sustainably transact with the outside to pursue the reconstruction and 
development goals. 
 
10. Whilst it remains a primary responsibility of the authorities and people of Somaliland to 
deploy efforts to acquire political recognition from the international community, the AU 
should be disposed to judge the case of Somaliland from an objective historical viewpoint and 
a moral angle vis-à-vis the aspirations of the people. Furthermore, given the acute 
humanitarian situation prevailing in Somaliland, the AU should mobilise financial resources 
to help alleviate the plight of the affected communities, especially those catering for the IDPs 
and Returnees. 
 
11. Finally, given, also, the high potential for conflict between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, the 
AU should take steps to discuss critical issues in the relations between the two towns. That 
initiative should be taken the earliest possible. 
 
 
